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Abstract
The following thesis confronts pre-existing histories of the English
conquest of Jamaica which primarily write about it within either the Caribbean
context or the more narrow European context. These prior histories tend to
misinterpret the central causes of why Spain was unable to successfully dislodge
the English between 1655 to 1660. Previous histories typically cite it as evidence
for a broader Spanish or Habsburg decline. By reframing this conquest within a
broader Atlantic context, which takes into account both the Caribbean and
European perspectives, the reader will come to see why Jamaica was lost by the
Spanish to the English. This was primarily because Iberian forces were heavily
involved in European conﬂicts and thus unable to traverse the Atlantic.
Meanwhile, Spanish Caribbean forces were instructed to, and primarily focused
on, the defense of their ports and territories to ensure that the wealth of the
‘Indies’ made it safely to Spain proper. The thesis relies on primary source
documents from both Spanish and English authors to show what the priorities of
the Spanish were at the time and in doing so show that Jamaica was not one of
those priorities.
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1
Introduction: Paradise Lost?
Without question, 1655 and the English seizure of Jamaica marked a
turning point in the history of the Atlantic world. To many, this event deﬁnitively
commenced the decline of Spain as a world power and the rise of the English in
their place. This 'conquest' of Jamaica is said to be the ﬁrst English capture of
American territory previously held by another European power .1 As such, it is
lauded prominently as a milestone in the development of the ‘ﬁrst’ British
Empire. To many historians, it represents the rise of this empire at the explicit
expense of the Spanish. While it can be tempting to be swept up in the drama of
such a narrative, it may be largely untrue. While it was the ﬁrst capture of
Spanish land by the English using force, it was far from being their ﬁrst
settlement in the Americas; Jamestown and Plymouth in North America, along
with 8 islands in the Caribbean were permanently settled by the English before
the conquest of Jamaica. Moreover, the Western Design which led to an English
Jamaica took place within the chaos of the civil war era in England. In addition,
the loss of Jamaica by the Spanish did not signify an empire in decline. The
Spanish Empire was dynamic, vibrant, and even resurgent in the following
century. To fully grasp how invalid such histories are, we must come to
understand this conquest within the context of the Atlantic world in the middle
of the 17th century. This requires an understanding of Habsburg notions of
monarchy, actual English strength, and the eﬀects of ongoing conﬂicts in

Carla Gardina Pestana, The English Conquest of Jamaica: Oliver Cromwell’s Bid for Empire,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017, 130.
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Western Europe on the Caribbean.
First, it must be clearly understood that the Habsburg Monarchy was
composite in nature. This meant that the King of “Spain” ruled over a variety of
dominions, each with their own customs, government, and taxes. King Philip IV
Habsburg had an exceptionally long title in which he was king of Castile, Aragon,
the Two Sicilies, and the Indies, as well as a prince, count, or duke of a variety of
other locations across Flanders, Burgundy, and Italy. Most importantly, the kings
of “Spain” had been kings of Portugal since the time of Philip IV’s grandfather,
Philip II. However, starting in 1640, the Portuguese nobility revolted against the
Habsburgs in favor of the native Duke of Braganza. This revolt was extremely
dear to Philip IV’s heart because the central goal of a Habsburg Monarch was
ensuring the inheritance remained intact for the succeeding heir.2 Having already
lost the northern part of the Spanish Netherlands, the United Provinces, Philip
IV adamantly refused to see any further damage to the reputacion of the
Habsburgs. In the Atlantic context, the situation was somewhat diﬀerent, as
Philip’s title called him ‘King of the Indies’ rather than King, Prince, Duke, or
Count of Jamaica, or any other speciﬁc territory or island. It meant that, in a way
not unlike the loss of the United Provinces, the loss of a portion rather than the
whole could be rationalized and accepted.
In a similar manner, England was grappling with the turmoil caused in
part by the nature of composite monarchy. Starting in the second quarter of the

Silvia Z. Mitchell, Queen, Mother, and Stateswoman: Mariana of Austria and the Government of Spain,
Penn State University Press, 2019, 86.
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seventeenth century England had found itself embroiled in the Wars of the Three
Kingdoms, England, Scotland, and Ireland. Charles I had been the composite
monarch of all three but his personal rule of 11 years had led to rebellion and
then civil war.3 The increasing reliance on military force to resolve political
disputes had found power concentrated in the hands of Oliver Cromwell by 1655.
Cromwell desired a transition to a civilian government as well as the spread and
triumph of the Protestant cause. His ‘Western Design’ to capture a piece of the
Spanish Empire was a key step in achieving both those goals. Its subsequent
failure, despite the acquisition of Jamaica, meant that new methods needed to be
employed to ensure his political aims. What followed in the wake of the ‘Western
Design’ was the continuation of the civil war albeit on the continent rather than
in the British Isles. Despite the conﬂict’s relocation, it was still a disruption for
England which threatened the project of pacifying and settling Jamaica, and
eventually the Three Kingdoms themselves.
This continuation of the civil war on the European continent was part of
the larger Franco-Spanish War, itself an oﬀshoot of the larger Thirty Years War
and smaller War of the Mantuan Succession. The casus belli of this conﬂict is
largely unimportant as the war is really the start of the French expansionism
which culminated during the long reign of Louis XIV. As such, there were open
fronts in Flanders, Italy, and Catalonia. Spain also had to contend with the
Portuguese rebellion which annually saw campaigns around where Portugal

Robert Bucholz and Newton Key, Early Modern England, 1485-1714: A Narrative History, 2nd ed.
Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, 239.
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borders Galicia and Extremadura. Meanwhile, the Portuguese were engaged in an
ongoing conﬂict with the Dutch which mostly took place in each belligerent’s
respective colonial possessions. These conﬂicts were expressed in the larger
Atlantic context in the form of privateering. In an eﬀort to cut the costs of
maintaining several navies deployed across the globe, early modern states
granted ‘commissions’ to private men-of-war to harass and capture enemy
merchant ships. The state received a portion of the plunder as well as the
knowledge that their enemy’s wealth or supplies were not reaching them. The
privateer, of course, enjoyed the plunder and perhaps even the satisfaction of
serving their country or king. Less scrupulous English privateers could choose
between English or French commissions in the Caribbean or even Portuguese
commissions depending on whomever Spain happened to be at war within the
continent. This created a highly suspicious atmosphere in the Caribbean which
was only heightened by the long-standing idea of “No peace beyond the line”
which eﬀectively meant that a permanent state of war existed in the Americas.4
Naturally, Spanish-American oﬃcials had to be vigilant when foreign ships
sailed into their ports. Despite whatever peace might exist in Europe, those ships
might still intend harm.
As we have already seen then, Spanish power and legal claim to land in the
Americas were far from inviolable by 1655. In addition to an English presence in
the Americas and Caribbean, were French, Dutch, Swedish, Danish, and

Frances Gardiner Davenport, and Charles Oscar Paullin, European Treaties Bearing on the History
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Portuguese colonies. Spain maintained her claim to a New World monopoly, but
the Reformation, Dutch Revolt, Thirty Years War, and its successor wars, had
made enforcement of those claims increasingly diﬃcult. Unsurprisingly, most of
the aforementioned powers ﬁrst established permanent colonies towards the
start of the 17th century when Spanish forces were heavily concentrated on the
European Continent. The Dutch Revolt was acutely damaging to Spain and
exacerbated the long-lasting Thirty Years War during which a truce between
Spain and the United Provinces expired.5 To forget that the non-Spanish
European colonization of the Americas was closely linked to the wars and crises
of Europe is to forget half of the history. The English seizure of Jamaica, despite
occurring a er the cessation of pan-European conﬂict in 1648, still took place at
a time in which Spain was engaged in conﬂict across 4 European fronts.
Therefore the conﬂicts within Europe at this time heavily shaped Spanish
policies. Worsening the problem was the fact that they came at a time when
Habsburg Spanish revenues began to decline. 6 The beginning of the 17th century
had wreaked havoc on Spain and her colonial possessions, including those in
Europe. As previously mentioned the most important by 1655 was the rebellion in
Portugal. Overseeing the dissolution of the Iberian Union undeniably marked his
reign as a failure. Thus, by the time of the English conquest of Jamaica, the
Spanish could ill-aﬀord further catastrophes. Another protracted European war
was far too costly, and the disruption of the galeones and ﬂotas’ journeys back to
Melvyn Bragg, The Thirty Years War, In Our Time: History, n.d.
Richard Lachmann, “Greed and Contingency: State Fiscal Crises and Imperial Failure in Early
Modern Europe,” American Journal of Sociology 115, no. 1 (2009): 39–73.
5
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Spain from America were equally undesirable.
Consequently, we must understand that the Spanish were seeking peace
with England to ensure that American wealth crossed the Atlantic. Spanish
foreign policy at this moment had two primary objectives: secure an unbroken
Habsburg inheritance in Europe, and utilize the wealth of the Indies to fund the
campaigns which the former required. The ﬁrst objective necessarily meant
peace with expansionist France and squashing the Portuguese rebellion.
Meanwhile the English sought to establish more colonies in the Americas, and
a er ﬁrst failing to capture Hispaniola, they settled on Jamaica and built it upon
foundations as shaky as the sands of Port Royal. The narrative of the Spanish loss
of Jamaica hastening their irreversible decline at the hands of a surging England
must be reconciled with these facts. By the time the Godolphin Treaty was signed
in 1670, the Spanish had ensured peace on the English front and promoted the
further paciﬁcation of the Caribbean. Likewise, the English had secured free
trade with the Spanish in America, and an internationally recognized Caribbean
island by treaty. We must not let this honorable outcome distract from the fact
that there was a 5-year long struggle for control of Jamaica between the Spanish
and English on the island.
The ultimate failure of the group that retreated into the Blue Mountains in
May 1655 to recapture Jamaica is the primary focus of what follows. The goal is
to answer the o -asked question of why the Spanish were unable to reconquer
Jamaica. As mentioned, past explanations have centered on the weakness and
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decline of ‘Spain’ or the rise of England as the most important factor. However,
by analyzing Jamaica within the Atlantic context, it becomes clear that the
inability to reconquer Jamaica was not inevitable but part of two conscious
decisions and one fatal assumption. First, Iberian-Spain chose not to dispatch a
relief ﬂeet nor alter the route of the silver ﬂeets to secure the island as a
consequence of European warfare. Second, Spanish American oﬃcials chose to
prioritize the defense of their dominions over the reconquest of Jamaica. In
addition, some oﬃcials even chose to engage in illicit trade with the English
around Jamaica. These decisions ensured that an external force did not play a
decisive role in recapturing Jamaica.
Finally, the Spanish Resistance assumed that the Black inhabitants of the
island were as loyal to King Philip as they were, when in fact the priorities of that
group lay elsewhere. So when the initial resistance began, it began with a retreat
into areas best known to the formerly enslaved Blacks or the descendants of the
formerly enslaved Blacks. These groups, supplemented by slaves that ran away
during the English invasion, formed what can be deemed the ‘Black Resistance.’
It must be said that the Black Resistance was separate from and independent of,
the Spanish Resistance. The Spaniards on the island failed to meaningfully
incorporate the Black Resistance into their ranks. This proved to be the fatal
error which doomed their cause. Again, the Spanish Jamaicans chose to base
their resistance in the areas best known to the Black Resistance. For 4 years then,
the Spanish Resistance relied on the knowledge, expertise, and strength of this
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community to make such resistance viable. Lulled into thinking the cooperation
between the Spanish Jamaicans and Black Jamaicans was the obedience of the
latter to the former, the Spanish were shocked when the Black Resistance was at
the head of the ﬁnal English push to evict them.
Jamaica up to 1655
Before the end of Spanish control of Jamaica can be understood, its time
as a Habsburg possession must be explained. Jamaica's European experience
dates back to Columbus' second voyage in 1494 and was linked with Columbus'
descendants to the present through its creation as a Marquisate of that family.
The ﬁrst Marquis of Jamaica was Columbus' grandson, Luis Colón and the ﬁnal
marquis to hold real power on the island was Don Pedro Nuño Colón de
Portugal, who went on to serve as Viceroy of New Spain and could only lament
the loss of his "ancestral" lands.7 It was the personal dominion of the Columbus
family and while a component of the Habsburg Monarchy, it was not subject to
its direct oversight. The administration of Jamaica as a largely autonomous
marquisate helps to explain the neglected state of the island when the English
conquered it, and which it remained in throughout the resistance to that
conquest.
The Marquisate of Jamaica was, therefore, cut-oﬀ from direct control of
the Habsburgs from 1557 on, and for a quarter-century prior the arrival of Penn

Francisco Morales Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, Trans, Translated by Patrick Bryan, Michael Gronow,
and Felix Oviedo Moral, Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003, 66.
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and Venables, it had been cut-oﬀ from direct contact with the Crown.8 The
administrative situation of Jamaica coupled with Crown regulations regarding
the ﬂow of commerce surrounding the island created the political and economic
conditions on the island. Compounding the island’s isolation was the Crown’s
strict shipping regulations for the annual galeones and ﬂotas. Those shipping
regulations centered on the need to eﬀectively protect Spanish vessels during the
trans-Atlantic journey.
There had been plans for an Armada de Barlovento permanently stationed
in the West Indies tasked with protecting Spanish merchants. However, the
situation in Europe eﬀectively tied the Crown's hands and prevented serious
attempts at such a ﬂeet until the 1660s. The desire to protect the merchant ships
remained though, and developed into the system of galeones and ﬂotas. The
galeones delivered supplies to the Province of Tierra Firme and the ﬂotas
conducted aﬀairs with the Province of New Spain. Both ﬂeets did in fact pass by
Jamaica: the galeones on their way to Cartagena, and the ﬂotas on their way to
Veracruz. Before reaching those ports the ships conducted trade with important
centers in the Caribbean such as Santo Domingo. Once anchored at their
respective ports-of-call, they continued to sell goods to the residents of those
provinces while loading up those provinces' treasures, mostly in the form of
silver. What must be recognized is that when the galeones and ﬂotas passed by
Jamaica, they were not laden with bullion; this fact is o en forgotten when

Jon Latimer, Buccaneers of the Caribbean: How Piracy Forged an Empire, Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009, 92.
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scholars exaggerate the threat created by the English in Jamaica.
In any case, the two ﬂeets would ideally rendezvous in la Habana,
whereupon they make their return as one ﬂeet to Sevilla. The carefully proscribed
route and schedule eﬀectively denied Jamaica any participation in the Spanish
Atlantic economy. The residents of the island could not aﬀord the heavily taxed
items aboard the ﬂeets, and the ships too o en appeared at times where the
residents’ goods either weren't ready or had spoiled. The result, as Padrón puts it,
was that, "no one dared to despatch a ship to Jamaica for the purposes of trade."9
This predicament required the residents of Jamaica to ﬁnd alternative methods to
meet their needs.
One way of meeting those needs was through illicit trading with foreign
smugglers. The composite nature of the Habsburg monarchy meant that taxation
was asymmetrically applied in early modern Spain, with Castille shouldering
most of that burden. This tax burden was transferred to the Indies through
export and import duties. A tax was levied on goods leaving Seville, and a second
on goods entering an American port. The result was a severe markup on
essentially all goods. Jamaicans were unable and unwilling to pay those prices.
Although tax breaks were granted by the Crown, the population still did not have
access to those goods for the reasons mentioned above. This pushed the
Jamaicans into the arms of smugglers who could provide necessary supplies at
cheaper prices. The governors of Jamaica o en tacitly allowed the trade because

Francisco Morales Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, Trans, Translated by Patrick Bryan, Michael Gronow,
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they received the lowest salary of all oﬃcials in the Antilles. This meant the
governors could supplement their meager salary with bribes, or direct
involvement in the trade.10 While these smugglers played a vital role in sustaining
the population of an island like Jamaica, they were called rescatadores, or pirates
by the Crown. There was a good reason for this. The smugglers who plied the
Caribbean were o en the same vessels and crews who had forcibly stolen the
goods in the ﬁrst place.
Thus, Spanish Jamaica was only ever theoretically Spanish. To better
reﬂect this material truth, Jamaica should be understood as an island that was
predominantly settled by Spaniards who recognized the authority of the King.
However, that kingly authority had been delegated to the Marquis of Jamaica, and
was rarely submitted to by those inhabitants. The ties that bound Jamaica to
Spain existed on paper and could be broken as easily as that paper which created
the Marquisate.
Jamaica was a thinly populated, forgotten frontier of an island.11 An island
on the margins of the periphery. Lack of direct control from the Crown resulted
in a severely undefended island; requests to fortify the island had to go through
the Marquis rather than the King. There was knowledge of possible attacks
forthcoming at Hispaniola and Jamaica for over a decade before the Western
Design. In a letter from 1644, King Philip made it known that Jamaica is at great
risk of attack. To defend the island, and the whole of the Indies he asked the
Ibid, 70.
Kathleen Deagan, “The Archaeology of the Spanish Contact Period in the Caribbean,” Journal
of World Prehistory 2, no. 2 (1988): 198.
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viceroy to, “assist and aid the fortresses and ports of the Windward Islands with
the gunpowder munitions and other necessary things for its defense and
preservation, because of the impossibility that there is of doing it from these
Kingdoms with respect to how much they consume themselves in the small
armies and present wars.”12 When in 1655 there was another imminent threat, the
situation in Europe had not improved at all. This meant that essentially the same
wars which prevented Spain from sending direct military assistance to the
Americas in 1644 prevented military assistance in 1655. The ongoing war with
France, the continued rebellion in Portugal, and the additional outbreak of war
with England in Europe all hindered whatever desire there may have been to set
out from Spain to recapture Jamaica, the ﬁnal possession of the Columbian
Dynasty.
Therefore, in 1670 when the Spanish oﬃcially recognized English
possession of the island, they were giving up an island that they never fully
possessed and which brought them no direct income. Past histories too o en rely
on English accounts which amplify the importance and value of Spanish Jamaica
so as to amplify the importance and value of its conquest.
Historiography
A major obstacle to overcoming such an understanding is the prior
scholarship of the 'English conquest' or 'Spanish loss' of Jamaica. Those
descriptions alone necessarily assume the power of the former or the weakness of
Felipe IV, “Carta Del Rey a Virrey Garcia,” Real Cedulas Originales Y Duplicados, January 23,
1644, AGN/IC/RCO y DUP/RCO/Vol. 2/ 4068/30/Exp. 30, Archivo General de la Nacion, Mexico
D.F., Mexico.
12
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the latter. Both suﬀer from a teleological approach in which a proﬁtable English
Jamaica is assumed and the reduction of Spain to the Iberian peninsula, is taken
for granted. How could Spain permit such an egregious loss of such rich
territory? Would they not have dispatched all available resources to immediately
secure the island? These answers to these questions depend on whether the
historian places this event within either the American or Jamaican contexts. In
the former context, scholarship tends to favor an explanation wherein England
conquers Spanish Jamaica, paving the route for the ‘ﬁrst’ British Empire. In the
latter context, Spain is an empire in decline under the leadership of the
penultimate Habsburg monarch. By favoring one context over the other rather
than placing them in an Atlantic context, Jamaica represents either the
unstoppable rise of England or an inexcusable breakdown of imperial authority.
It obfuscates the material conditions which existed on the island, as well as
overstating the actual importance of the island with the larger scheme of
Habsburg Monarchy and Empire. However, this false dichotomy of contexts has
persisted because historians have only recently pursued Atlantic history as a
methodology, despite the immediate ﬁrsthand accounts of the actual events
written by ﬁrmly Atlantic characters.
The inescapable fact is that within 5 years of the English arrival in
Jamaica, the home government had seen the Restoration of Charles II. The new
regime had to square the Protectorate’s ill-gotten gains and looked suspiciously
on ‘popery’ and puritanism alike. Oddly enough they even feared that the last
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bastion of English Puritanism in America, Massachusetts Bay, would declare
itself in favor of the King of Spain, despite the vast ideological gulf between
them.13 Naturally then, the explanations oﬀered from that early point reduced the
Spanish presence on the island as a foreign other with a sort of ‘proto-orientalist’
gaze. Spanish dominion over the island had to exemplify all they found abhorrent
in Catholicism so as to further justify Jamaica’s acquisition. Or its acquisition
needed to align with the triumph of the unique Anglican Protestant Church. It is
with this understanding which I will analyze the earliest histories of Jamaica and
how the English came to possess the island.
Highlighting that perspective are some of the earliest accounts created to
explain the English conquest of the island. They paint the picture of an encounter
with a completely alien civilization, almost like the interactions between
Spaniards and Native Americans a century prior. Underscoring the ‘otherness’ of
Spanish Jamaica is an account in which the Western Design comes to the shores
of Jamaica to ﬁnd it governed by a woman who tried to defend the island through
seduction and bribery.14 In creating an account like this, the story of Jamaica
becomes divorced from the disaster which preceded it in Hispaniola and
distanced further still from the hard-fought guerilla campaign which followed it.
Dangerously, it is upon this foundation that all other scholarship was based. The
emasculation of the Spanish government in Jamaica in this literal sense was
"America and West Indies: February 1662," in Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West
Indies: Volume 5, 1661-1668, ed. W Noel Sainsbury (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Oﬃce, 1880),
71-80, British History Online, 242.
14
James Robertson, “Re‐writing the English Conquest of Jamaica in the Late Seventeenth
Century,” The English Historical Review 117, no. 473 (September 1, 2002): 821–22.
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never fully refuted by later scholars who, ﬁnding no records of a female Spanish
governor, perpetuated her myth in the character of the actual oﬃcials on the
island in 1655. The female governor became the weakness of Spanish military
resistance in the face of overwhelmingly strong Englishmen.
Any earnest historiography of Jamaican history, and especially the
beginnings of the English occupation of that island, must begin with Edward
Long’s The History of Jamaica. Written in 1774, Long provides one of the most
comprehensive accounts of the island up to that point in time. It is also deeply
embedded within notions of English superiority engaging with an inferior
Spanish counterpart. Therefore Long’s narrative is ﬁrmly within the Jamaican
context, and he o en gives precedence to English decisions and actions. Long’s
account is slightly more complex though as he acknowledges that there were
moments when the English were barely maintaining the island. Notable too, is
that Long includes an account of the disastrous attempt to take Hispaniola.
However, he puts much of the blame at the feet of the commissioners of the
expedition, again making the English the undisputed center of events. The
Commissioners were some of the most severe puritans in the expedition, and
from his late 18th-century perspective, they were prime targets for a scathing
critique. Long’s account is so ﬁlled with critiques of the orders of the
commissioners that it’s not until eight pages into his recounting of the
Hispaniolan campaign that he actually mentions the Spanish repelling the
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English on the island.15
Once the English moved onto Jamaica, Long appears to provide a balanced
account of the events as they unfolded in 1655. He includes explicit explanations
of the poor situation of the English troops on the island, but he refuses to
recognize any role which the Spanish played in bringing their misery about.
According to Long, there was a conspiracy amongst some of the oﬃcers who
sought to force Cromwell to call for their return to England or redeployment in
Flanders. As evidence Long cites the poor supplies which the army endured in
the ﬁrst two years in Jamaica.16 Rather than a conspiracy, this was probably more
indicative of embezzlement on the part of the victualers. It was quite common at
that time for them to augment their salary by inﬂating their purchases to match
the money which they had received.
As the narrative continues into the 5-year guerilla campaign, Long
wholeheartedly disavows the notion that the Spanish were interested in, or
actually trying to bring about the restitution of the island. When recounting the
battles of Las Chorreras and Rio Nuevo, Long attributes the English victory to
their “gallantry” and the Spanish defeat was chalked up to their “cowardice.”17
Long is also deeply critical of Christobal Arnaldo Isassi, whom he portrays as a
self-interested villain only seeking his own survival and vainglory. He writes that

Edward Long, The History of Jamaica. Or, General Survey of the Antient and Modern State of That
Island:: With Reﬂections on Its Situation, Settlements, Inhabitants, Climate, Products, Commerce, Laws,
and Government. In Three Volumes. Illustrated with Copper Plates, T. Lowndes, in Fleet-Street., 1774,
230.
16
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Don Christobal was the ﬁrst to retreat, was convinced of his own heroism, and
eager to remove himself to Cuba.18 These accusations don’t stand up to the
evidence which exists in Spanish archives which show that Isassi had been in
Jamaica for the duration of the 1655-1660 resistance, had refused to leave the
island, and was engaged in proposing a return to the island a er he was forced to
leave. In Long’s defense, he did not have the archival resources at his disposal
which a modern historian does. Moreover, Long was an 18th Century Englishman
writing during the zenith of the ‘First British Empire,’ it was incredibly diﬃcult
to avoid narratives which highlighted the triumph of Englishmen when he could
point to a century of such triumphs. Unsurprisingly, his work was incredibly
inﬂuential in perpetuating the myth of the Jamaican conquest which still persists
in some circles.
Another history from roughly a century later and within the Caribbean
context claims that Spanish wealth and decadence so so ened them that they
were neither productive nor proactive. This perspective comes from “Jamaica: its
History, Constitution, and Topographical Description” by John Jarrett Wood
written in 1884. Wood appears to have been an educator in Jamaica and wrote the
book for educational purposes. When writing on the English conquest of Jamaica,
Wood spends little time on the failure of the Hispaniola expedition (all of one
sentence). Of pre-conquest Jamaica, he writes, “All accounts, however, agree in
representing the Hidalgos of Jamaica as leading a life of slothful luxuriousness.”19
Ibid, 279-280.
John Jarrett Wood, Jamaica: Its History, Constitution, and Topographical Description : With
Geological and Meteorological Notes (McCartney & Wood, 1884), 9.
18
19

18
Most later historians disagree with this assessment of the island and the most
recent scholarship greatly diminishes the validity of that statement. His account
of the conquest does acknowledge the diﬃculty in fully removing the Spanish
from the island as well as the diﬃculty in persuading English soldiers to actually
settle the island. On the whole though, Wood presents a highly biased account of
the English conquest.
It must be noted though, that Wood appears to have been writing with the
purpose of educating the young minds of late 19th century Jamaica. The audience
of his piece is particularly relevant when analyzing passages such as this,
Spain in 1658 vainly endeavoured to recover Jamaica...the rapid
acquirement of wealth without the aid of industry, and almost solely by
means of violence and cra , is as fatal to the strength and happiness of a
nation as it is to that of an individual, and the Spanish government, a er
several unsuccessful eﬀorts, abandoned all further prospects of
repossessing themselves of the island.20
This passage seems to be more directed at teaching a lesson about the merits of
wealth through hard-work than any attempt at actual historical work. While
Wood’s assessment may have some validity when looking at particular people in
other parts of the Spanish Empire, it is wholly inadequate in describing the
actual conditions of Jamaica. Later historians recognize and understand that
Jamaica was a frontier island; it was not uninhabited like Barbados, but it was a
far cry from Santo Domingo or Cuba. When Jamaica is understood in this
manner, as a frontier removed from Spanish wealth, it becomes possible to
understand why the Spanish surrendered the island in a formal treaty.
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Another perspective on this topic that ﬁrmly places the events in question
within the Jamaican context only is Irene Wright’s “The Spanish Resistance to
the English Occupation of Jamaica, 1655-1660.” Wright seems largely
uninterested in making any arguments regarding why the Spanish were unable to
remove the English from Jamaica. However, Wright portrayed the Spanish
troops, under the leadership of Isassi, as inexperienced and the Spanish leaders
as incompetent and petty. On the failure of the ﬁrst relief expedition she wrote,
“Captain Juan de los Reyes was occupied in furnishing history with a ﬁne
example of what envy and personal animosity can accomplish toward defeating a
cause.”21 Despite being one of the most capable translators of Spanish archival
documents, Wright limited this article to one collection of documents aptly
entitled, ‘Documents about the loss of the island of Jamaica’ in the Archivo
General de Indias. This ensured that Wright did not utilize the existing English
translation of de los Reyes’ orders which question the characterization that he
was purely fueled by petty jealousy. Furthering this case, she wrote that, “surer
sources of certain failure lay in the petty jealousies existing among the Spanish
oﬃcials, civil and military alike.”22 For Wright, the success of the English lay in
large part with the incompetence and weakness of the Spanish who were unable
to muster a whole-hearted eﬀort to remove the English from the island.
Wright made frequent use of Spanish archival sources in formulating her
argument about the weak but irritating Spanish-American attempts to reclaim
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Jamaica. The balance Wright strikes in primary sources strengthens the overall
narrative, despite the aforementioned errors. She utilizes documents from Don
Pedro Bayona de Villanueva, the Spanish-born governor of Cuba at the time, Don
Cristobal Arnaldo de Isassi, the Basque governor of Jamaica, and the Duke of
Alburquerque, the viceroy of New Spain at the time. These men were the key
ﬁgures tasked with la reconquista of Jamaica and it was largely up to them to
decide how to accomplish the task. Wright is able to eﬀectively utilize these
sources when she discusses the inﬁghting amongst the Spanish-American
oﬃcials that hindered their ability to take Jamaica. Each man’s account of what
went wrong and who is to blame furthers Wright’s claim that Spanish-American
leadership was weakened by rivalry. Wright skillfully weaves this into her overall
narrative of Spanish-American resistance. While these rivalries amongst
Spanish-American leadership did exist, and while those rivalries hampered the
Spanish in this instance, they were neither unique nor as petty as presented. One
need look no further than the immediate fate of Penn and Venables. These men
raced back to England to present the other as the primary factor in the failure at
Hispaniola. As such, her use of English sources is troubling.
On the English side, she mainly relies on the diary and correspondence of
Colonel Edward D’Oyley, the man in charge of repelling Spanish assaults on
Jamaica. The conclusions she comes to about English strength come
predominantly from this English soldier. One passage illustrates this bias,
But D'oyley, with his reorganised army into which courage had returned,
had pressed the Spaniard hard, and lack of consistent support had so
diminished Ysassi's strength that now, in the summer of 1657, far from
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remaining penned within their defences in the town, as he had described
them in the spring of 1656, the English were reported to sleep abroad
tranquilly, even in the parties pursuing him, their horses picketed-so great
was their conﬁdence in Ysassi's inability to disturb.23
Her use of the phrase, “his reorganised army into which courage had returned,”
clearly indicates a bias in favor of the idea of English strength. Although she is
an American historian, Wright seems to display a favor towards the idea that the
English had superior strength and fortitude. This is exacerbated by the fact that
she does not directly cite D’Oyley’s diary or correspondence, leading the reader
to believe that this idea is her own. While Wright is successful in using Spanish
documents, she is less eﬀective in utilizing English sources. This diminishes the
overall validity of her narrative that Spanish resistance was mired due to the
strength of the English and the weakness and incompetence of the Spanish.
Wright is correct in citing rivalries among Spanish-American leaders as a
handicap but does not recognize that their counterparts, the English were
negatively impacted by the same impulses. The English forces were also little
more than a ragtag group of outlaws and misﬁts cast out of England proper to
serve as at worst, cannon fodder, and at best colonists. Wright also fails to look
beyond the immediate Jamaican context when considering concepts like
‘strength’ and ‘weakness.’ Wright’s argument is weakened by this lack of the
Atlantic context. This is even though Wright urged students of this history to
consider this broader context explicitly,
The wisdom of the policy which, to the dominion of Jamaica, preferred the
immediate delivery even of three years' " plate " from Peru plus one year's
proﬁt from Mexico must be judged in the light of European, rather than
23
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American history. The relative importance of these alternatives does not
appear to the student who conﬁnes his consideration to the Jamaican
enterprise alone.24
Unfortunately, Wright does little in that article to elucidate exactly what made
such a policy so wise. This present scholarship intends to do just that.
Meanwhile, the main Spanish authority on the subject is Francisco
Morales Padrón, whose book, Spanish Jamaica provides one of the fullest accounts
of the entire history of the island. Of particular note are his chapters regarding
the loss of Jamaica to the English. In the book, Padrón builds a case that
suﬃciently shows that Jamaica’s value to Spain had long since peaked by the time
the English washed upon the shore. On no less than 3 separate occasions Padrón
writes that Jamaica was an unimportant island in the larger Habsburg scheme.
He wrote of the lack of mineral wealth on the island, “This was the reason and
none other that caused the island to be relegated to oblivion for a number of
years."25 Additionally, Padrón analyzed the absence of Jamaica in signiﬁcant
trans-Atlantic commerce, stating that “no one dared to despatch a ship to
Jamaica for the purpose of trade." and "few ships arrived in the island from
Spain, and all European products had to be purchased at exploitative prices in the
market of Cartagena de Indias."26
Despite fundamentally understanding the diminished role of Jamaica
within contemporary imperial aims and pursuits, Padrón descends into a
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teleological approach when explaining how the Spanish lost the island. Best
summarizing his position is what follows, “Jamaica, an integral part of the
Spanish Empire, became the hub of the English West Indies.”27 It is puzzling how
the description of Jamaica as an ‘integral part’ of the Spanish Empire is
juxtaposed with overwhelming evidence he provided on the contrary. This
unhelpful assumption deeply alters Padrón’s analysis of the guerilla campaign
which followed the initial invasion. It places his narrative within a ﬁrmly
Caribbean context and leads to two substantial ﬂaws. First, in working back from
the knowledge that Jamaica was going to become an immensely proﬁtable colony
for England, and second in assuming that 17th Century Spain had been able to
extract similar proﬁt, or even had the knowledge that such proﬁt was possible.
These core assumptions necessarily color his analysis of Spanish attempts
to recover the island. Summed up, the energy expended to recover the island was
never commensurate with what one might expect given the assumed wealth at
stake. Momentous orders like Philip IV’s decision not to dispatch a ﬂeet from
Spain to the island seem deeply misguided when framed with the potential for
proﬁt Padrón assumes they were aware of. On the contrary (and in Padrón’s
history), we see that very recently Philip had made a conscious decision not to
engage further with Jamaica on any meaningful level.28 Because the importance
placed on Jamaica was never very high, the resources gained from it little, and the
population small, the eﬀort to recover it matched in nearly every way. Small
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numbers of reinforcements were sent, little funding and material allocated for
the cause, and references to the island only brieﬂy and in the context of larger
issues. Padrón’s history of Jamaica reads like a response to the generation of 1898
and a return to the defeatism which they objected to. While his book is the
deﬁnitive Spanish language history of the island, it is not the only non-English
source of information.
There is also a French history of the island written by Thibault
Ehrengardt, The History of Jamaica from 1494 to 1838. The sweeping survey style of
this single-volume book means that there is only so much detail regarding the
English invasion of the island. However, given that this account comes to us in
the French language, it is important in getting a broader view of the perspectives
which exist on this event. Being both a Black and Francophone author,
Ehrengardt oﬀers one of the more unique perspectives on the events of the
island. Ehrengardt at times relies too heavily on Padrón’s work but still manages
to come to some important original conclusions. Chief among those is the
emphasis which Ehrengadt places on the maroon community in determining the
outcome of the Spanish resistance to the English invasion. On the subject, he
writes,
Ysassi did his best to make sure they remained loyal—when they shi ed
allegiance, the Spaniards deﬁnitively lost Jamaica. But some of the Spanish
slaves sided the invaders like Juan de bolas. Others took advantage of the
chaotic situation to stay on their own; they started to roam the island in
small groups, and, knowing no friends, attacked everyone.29
The gravity which Ehrengardt attributes to the decisions of the maroon
29
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community in determining the larger outcome is entirely justiﬁed. However,
conceptions of loyalty viz a vis the Black community are deeply speculative.
While the actions of someone like Juan de Bolas, who handed the Spaniards their
last defeat, might appear to signify a change of allegiance, we have no sources
from de Bolas himself to elucidate his motivations. From strictly his actions
though, it seems more likely that he was steadfastly loyal to the independence of
his community from Spanish and English interference alike.
A more recent history of the conquest of Jamaica is Carla Gardina
Pestana’s book, The English Conquest of Jamaica, Oliver Cromwell’s Bid for Empire in
which she presents the conquest within the context of English raiding in the
Caribbean. However, her central argument is to show that the apparatus which
supported future Restoration colonization was created by Cromwell and
embodied in his Western Design. The central narrative is that the experience of
pacifying and settling Jamaica, which was carried out under both Cromwell and
Charles II, required a strong central government that could adequately govern
colonial aﬀairs. While it does not presuppose any inherent English strength, it
does fall into the idea of the Spanish ‘losing’ Jamaica. Though not the central
ﬁgures of this history, the Spanish are presented as being unable to grasp the dire
situation in which they found themselves.
Pestana argues that the Spanish authorities gave up Jamaica because they
had mistakenly assumed that the English did not intend to settle permanently on
the island. She writes, “The Spanish, having mounted no resistance initially,
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claimed that they stumbled in that they were caught oﬀ guard by their own
conviction that the English meant only to rob them. With a long history in the
region of such visits by English (and other) ‘piratas,’ the Jamaicans might be
forgiven for expecting more of the same.”30 In addition to justifying the Spanish
response, Pestana criticizes General Venables’ actions, or rather inaction.
Pestana cites Venables’ delay in marching his troops to Santiago de la Vega as a
key setback to a complete English conquest of Jamaica.31 It is also clear that
Pestana does not view the English conquest as a show of strength. Earlier in the
book, Pestana writes about the decision to move on Jamaica,
The Design planners in England and its leaders in America all envisioned
a more substantial prize, either a larger island such as Hispaniola or Cuba,
or Cartagena, a major city on the mainland. Only on leaving Hispaniola
did the Commissioners settle on this more modest initial object...Jamaica
served no particular purpose within the Spanish Empire...The English
initially considered Jamaica too minor to satisfy the expedition’s goals. But
once the campaign began to go awry, the smaller island looked more
attractive.32
Far from narratives of English exceptionalism, Pestana presents the English
conquest as an eﬀort to rescue the Design from the complete failure it had been
up to that point.33
Pestana’s book represents the most recent scholarship on the subject of
the English conquest of Jamaica and continues in the tradition of balanced
sources. Like earlier historians, Pestana utilizes the accounts of Admiral William
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Penn, Robert Venables, and Edward D’Oyley. Unlike those historians, Pestana
uses some sources and accounts from unnamed Englishmen. She also introduces
a new Spanish source into this history. Pestana describes the account of Captain
Julian de Castilla as “the most-detailed Spanish version” of the English conquest
of Jamaica.34 It is notable though that Pestana makes use of Wright’s translation
of that account, for better or worse. As stated before, this balance of sources from
the men participating in the conquest or loss of Jamaica is praiseworthy. The
addition of de Castilla’s account is especially crucial as his writings illuminate
the Spanish perspective of the negotiated surrender of the island of Jamaica.
Pestana uses de Castilla to illustrate that the Spanish were caught oﬀ-guard by
English desires to settle the island while still looking down upon the English.35
While Pestana’s book furthers historical knowledge on this important
event, she fails to fully recognize the insigniﬁcance of Jamaica to the Spanish at
this time. She writes, “Fulﬁlling no speciﬁc need, Jamaica nonetheless had to be
kept out of the hands of others.”36 Her citation here is misleading, as one might
assume it leads the reader to archival Spanish documents. Instead, it leads the
readers to a few sources from previous historians discussing population estimates
for Jamaica at this time.37 While that information is useful in its own right, I
believe that actually gathering and reading available archival Spanish evidence
will show that the loss of Jamaica was insigniﬁcant and to a certain extent
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beneﬁcial to the Spanish. The Spanish became willing to surrender Jamaica to
the English once it became clear that it meant gaining safer passage for their
ﬂotas, in and out of the Caribbean. I agree in many ways with Pestana and her
argument, but I feel that it falls short to fully explain the conquest of Jamaica.
The ﬁnal key piece in the historiography comes via Casey Schmitt’s
article, “Centering Spanish Jamaica” from 2019. Despite disavowing the Atlantic
perspective in favor of a Caribbean context, “Squaring a weak and undersupplied
resistance with the relative strength of surrounding Spanish kingdoms, especially
the Viceroyalty of New Spain, requires analyzing Spanish Jamaica from a regional
perspective” it provides a worthwhile analysis that moves away from traditional
assumptions.38 Schmitt’s central argument is that an English controlled Jamaica
provided economic opportunity to other Spanish colonies in the vicinity through
illicit trade. The economics-driven policy of non-intervention which Schmitt
develops in the article is wholly new in the scholarship of Jamaica. Recognizing
this, Schmitt provides numerous examples of Spanish-American oﬃcials
proﬁting from illicit trade and then those same oﬃcials acting against the
interests of the Spanish Resistance in Jamaica. Schmitt speciﬁcally targets
Eastern Cuba or Santiago de Cuba, which was under the leadership of Bayona y
Villanueva for most of the guerilla resistance in Jamaica.
Honing in on Bayona y Villanueva and Santiago de Cuba provides the best
evidence in support of Schmitt’s argument. Of Santiago de Cuba she writes that
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they were excluded from “oﬃcial circuits of Spanish imperial trade” and “limited
access to oﬃcial trade networks and administrative postings led residents
in....eastern Cuba….to cultivate commercial ties with European traders involved
in informal, or unauthorized, commerce.”39 The conclusion from this evidence is
that governors like Bayona y Villanueva were reluctant to give up on the access to
illicit trade they enjoyed by giving aid to the Spanish Jamaicans. Strengthening
the argument is that Schmitt views it as a structural problem rather than a
personal one, which is supported by the fact that Isassi had trouble with both
Bayona y Villanueva and his successor Pedro de Morales. Schmitt writes, “In
deciding between coming to the aid of neighboring Jamaica or guaranteeing the
regular traﬃc of informal trade and using the supplies sent for Jamaica to bolster
his port's defenses against a possible English attack, the governor of Santiago de
Cuba chose the latter.”40 This analysis of the two governors of Santiago de Cuba is
critical in understanding that their actions were not the result of petty rivalries
but based on a consistent economic policy. However, it does not fully explain the
ultimate failure of the Spanish Resistance.
If one were to ‘zoom out’ from the small window between northern
Jamaica and eastern Cuba, Schmitt’s argument starts to unravel. Even just
looking at New Spain itself undermines the argument. Schmitt tries to
incorporate New Spain into the article as evidence of a relatively strong location
which nonetheless felt that it was more important to shore up their ports rather
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than assist Jamaica.41 While this is true, Schmitt’s own refusal to engage in an
Atlantic perspective prevents the reader from understanding why exactly the
Duke of Alburquerque would pursue such a policy if his dominions were
immersed in the Spanish imperial economy. It was not related to Alburquerque’s
involvement in illicit trade, so why then did he pursue such a course. By shi ing
to an Atlantic perspective it’s clear that this was done with an eye towards
ensuring the delivery of the galeones and ﬂotas to Spain. Despite this failing of the
article, Schmitt’s analysis is still invaluable in oﬀering new explanations that
avoid unquantiﬁable judgments on moral ﬁber or shi ing deﬁnitions of strong
and weak. Rather, her scholarship is based on solid foundations that rely on more
simple cost-beneﬁt analyses done by Spanish-American oﬃcials. This is not
without its own ﬂaws though, as it assumes a capitalist outlook that was wholly
foreign to those oﬃcials. In that case, then, scholarship should try to grapple
with how these oﬃcials rationalized their role within the maxims of the day.
Ideas like reputacion, obedezco pero no cumplo (I obey but I do not comply), and the
position of honor and faith in Spanish society, all informed the decision making
of Spanish-American oﬃcials. Even the more shrewd among them.

41

Ibid, 723.

31
The Invasion and Some Early Successes
A er Admiral Penn and General Venables' failed to seize Hispaniola, their
main objective, it was decided that they should pursue an alternative conquest.
While Cuba, Veracruz, Porto Bello, and Cartagena de Indies all lay to the
windward, they decided on Jamaica as their prey. Cromwell's instructions had
given him and Penn such freedom to make these decisions and at least Venables
was willing to exercise it. This of course begs the question as to why they
believed Jamaica was within their grasp. Perhaps it was because previous forays
in the Caribbean had successfully besieged Jamaica and made oﬀ with "plunder,"
though it in fact amounted to little more than stolen supplies. That probably
played a role, but the degree of their failure on Hispaniola convinced Venables
that those aforementioned cities lay beyond their capabilities at this moment.42
Jamaica oﬀered a means to avoid certain punishment back in England and
seemed to be in a desirable location. Even though Jamaica geographically sat at
the crossroads of the galeoness and ﬂotas as they made their way from Spain to the
West Indies and back again, Jamaica occupied a far less important role both
politically and economically.
Therefore, we should understand that when Venables and his men
stormed the island in 1655, they set foot on a backwater. Understanding this fact
is critical to understanding the events of the ﬁve years following the English
invasion of Jamaica. The neglected state of Jamaica meant that coordinated
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action between colonial governors was a prerequisite to defending the island.
When word was sent ahead to Santo Domingo warning of an English invasion,
those colonial governors utilized all available resources to strengthen Hispaniola,
Cuba, and New Spain. The same could not be said for Jamaica. Again any
fortiﬁcation had to be approved by the Marquis of Jamaica ﬁrst. The
contemporary Marquis of Jamaica believed that his island was undesirable to
other European powers because of its small port, and could be defended from its
mountains without requiring additional fortiﬁcations.43 Needless to say, he
elected not to reinforce the island.
Thus, on May 16th, 1655, when the English landed their men at Caguaya
they faced little resistance. Accounts from soldiers there or in the ﬂeet covering
them recorded that, "the [Spanish] seeing our resolution did not stand to give any
resistance, But run, leaving 3 guns mounted."44 At ﬁrst glance, such an account
may seem to suggest Spanish Jamaican cowardice or weakness and therefore
serve the narrative of a Spain in decline. However, one must take into account the
lived experience of the Spanish Jamaicans. A decade prior, William Jackson and
his men had raided Jamaica for supplies, received them, and then sailed oﬀ to
complete their otherwise disastrous voyage.45 The inhabitants of Jamaica, then,
had little reason to expect diﬀerent from this particular group of marauders.
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From this perspective, their lack of resistance is not cowardice or inherent
weakness of spirit, it was a rational decision based on the protection of their
self-interest. The defensive force was little more than a diversion to allow the rest
of the island's inhabitants to ﬂee into the mountains and the quick retreat
allowed that force to join their family members there.
With this frame of mind, the Spanish Jamaicans sent emissaries to the
English camp to discern their demands, that is what hides, meat, or produce they
desired. It was quite clear from these opening interactions that the Spanish
Jamaicans assumed these men to be of the familiar buccaneering sort. As
Venables' narrative goes, "A priest and a Major came to us to desire a treaty, and
that they would give us what in Reason we could desire."46 The General claims to
have indicated that they wished to settle, but his immediate demands betrayed
that claim and fell more in line with raids these Spanish Jamaicans had
experienced. In desperate need of provisions, he demanded cattle and bread; the
former was readily available and delivered, the latter was not. Needing a quick
peace a er their failure on Santo Domingo, Venables chose to overlook the lack
of bread and laid out his terms which he proudly based on the terms imposed on
the evicted Englishmen of Santa Catalina. It was at this point that it became clear
to the Spanish delegation that the English truly did intend to settle and colonize
the island.47
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The terms required that those who did not wish to submit to the laws of
England should turn in their weapons and any slaves they may have. A erward,
arrangements were made to transport them to New Spain. Those that did wish to
remain were also forced to turn over their slaves, but could keep their other
possessions, which for the elite of the island included their rapiers. These
provisions had clearly indicated that the English intended to colonize this island
with or without Spanish cooperation. What followed then, was an elaborate
diversion created by the Spanish Jamaicans to decide on a guerilla resistance to
defend the island. They complained that they needed time to decide on Venables'
terms, and when that time expired they next explained that their governor was
going to come and acquiesce to the terms within ten days' time. In all, about a
week was gained through Spanish pretension. During this time they were able to
gather what supplies and equipment they had and disappear into the mountains.
Ironically, when on May 26th, Governor Ramirez de Arellano signed the surrender
of the island, the conﬂict for its control actually began.
There are three central ﬁgures in the Spanish Jamaican resistance to the
English invasion, only one of which actually fought on the island. The man with
that distinction is Don Cristobal Arnaldo Isassi (or Ysassi), the last Spanish
governor of Jamaica. His resistance campaign was aided from New Spain by its
Viceroy, Don Francisco Fernández de la Cueva, a grandee from an illustrious
Spanish family. Lastly, there was the governor of Santiago de Cuba, Don Pedro de
Bayona y Villanueva; a man who lost that position as a result of his eﬀorts, or
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lack thereof. Around these central ﬁgures were the other governors and high
ranking oﬃcials in the Americas, the Council of the Indies, and of course King
Philip IV himself.
Don Cristobal Arnaldo Isassi was a native of Jamaica of Basque descent
and his family came from what could be considered Jamaica’s ‘upper class.’ He
had no formal military training but his nobler birth, age, and most importantly,
health thrust him into the Governorship of the island, which from the
"surrender" of the island onwards, was essentially a military post. Isassi was
either deeply devoted to the King's service or more than happy to play that part
when requesting further support. More likely than not, he was some of both. His
letters reveal a man who understood his duty and was able to recognize his faults.
They also indicate that he was deeply suspicious of other governors who did not
come to his aid. At ﬁrst, Isassi was deferential in accosting others, but as the
situation unfolded, he dropped the veil of humility and preferred more outright
attacks on other oﬃcials. Such attacks were largely reserved for the governors of
Santiago de Cuba, whom he felt undermined his eﬀorts at every turn.
The ﬁrst such governor was Don Pedro Bayona y Villanueva, who is o en
cast as Isassi's greatest rival and enemy. It is unfortunately not so simple. While
the case has been made that Bayona y Villanueva disdained Isassi and allowed
petty jealousies to hamper the relief eﬀort, it might not be that straightforward
or trivial. Historians like Casey Schmitt in "Centering Spanish Jamaica" have
oﬀered explanations that place Bayona's actions within the context of colonial
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Caribbean competition for illicit trade.
As previously mentioned, this "informal" trade thrived in Jamaica as
oﬃcial channels regularly passed the island by. Schmitt argues that Bayona, and
his successor de Morales, was distinctly aware of this fact and sought to divert
forms of illegal trade to Santiago de Cuba; if for no other reason than to ensure
that the proper taxes were paid. Bayona's Lieutenant Governor even accused him
of actively courting this trade, as did Isassi. His Lieutenant Governor may have
been biased though, as he was Don Francisco Leiva Isassi, Cristobal's own
brother. Schmitt claims that an English controlled Jamaica, therefore, presented
an economical opportunity for Santiago de Cuba, as it brought that illicit trade to
their doorstep and granted easier access to the slave trade.48 This certainly helps
to explain the jealousy earlier authors have noted, and give it credibility. Schmitt
believes this explains why the Spanish were unable to retake Jamaica. The
staging area for all relief eﬀorts was Santiago de Cuba, and a self-interested
Governor could and did interfere with those eﬀorts.
This argument is convincing but could be brought further. Schmitt sees
this action as exemplary of Colonial conditions not reﬂecting European contexts.
However, I argue that these jealousies, arguments, and selﬁsh oﬃcials ﬁt within
the European context as well. Where Schmitt is lacking, is in framing it within
the terms of the Habsburg Monarchy as a composite monarchy. The "Habsburg
Crown" in the singular, was actually several all sat atop one head. Each kingdom,
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principality, duchy, county, and margravate had diﬀerent tax burdens. Recall that
Castille bore the largest burden of taxes. It is not unthinkable that an oﬃcial in
Castille might look upon untaxed trade in Barcelona or Santander with envy and
seek to siphon it oﬀ for themself. What was diﬀerent in the Caribbean context
was the opportunity, not the motivation. A landlocked grandee in Spain could
never hope to direct trade away from a major port city. In order to do so, they had
to obtain the king's favor for a better posting in one of those cities, and perhaps
could resort to besmirching the current occupant of the desired post. This was
unlike the letters that Bayona, Francisco Leiva Isassi, and Cristobal Arnaldo
Isassi sent to the king.
However, one should not forget that genuine disagreements over best
practices could also be an important factor. Colonial governors have their unique
personal histories which must be accounted for when analyzing the decisions
they made. While it is tempting to strictly think of these men as privileged, but
inexperienced recipients of great honors, that was o en untrue in the Americas.
Hardened war veterans transitioned from soldiers to statesmen in the Americas,
and Bayona y Villanueva is only one such case. It is with this perspective that we
must interpret their actions to follow, and the steps taken by the colonial oﬃcial
directly above them.
Of course, that oﬃcial was the Viceroy of New Spain, Francisco
Fernández de la Cueva, Duke of Alburquerque. Alburquerque eventually became
mayordomo for Charles II, but at present, he served his father, Philip IV.
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Alburquerque in many ways was the quintessential Spanish noble. Devout, loyal,
and honorable, he served the King ﬁrst and foremost and expected others to do
the same. As Viceroy he held tremendous power as the head of the Spanish
Government in the New World. His power assisted Isassi's eﬀorts, but the
corresponding responsibility Alburquerque had also harmed Isassi's recovery. He
had to attend to matters of the Church, both physical and spiritual. The
Cathedral of Mexico City was not yet complete, and Alburquerque put
considerable energy into hastening its completion. Moreover, the conversion and
subjugation of indigenous people continued to be an ongoing drain on the
Viceroy's focus. As the highest-ranking oﬃcial in that part of the world, he was
also responsible for coordinating relief to the Philippines.49 New Spain was a vital
link between Spain and the East Indies and as viceroy, he had to embody that
link. A look through the documents from his reign as viceroy in the Archivo
General de la Nación in Mexico City, along with his predecessor and successors,
indicates a daunting position with a myriad of problems requiring at least some
level of attention. This meant that he was spread exceptionally thin on any single
issue, so he could only designate so much time and energy in overseeing the
reconquest of Jamaica.
As viceroy, his actions carried the same weight as if the king himself had
been present in the Indies. This meant that he was also bound by Habsburg belief
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in keeping all the kingdoms part of the Monarchy.50 Understanding that duty was
what compelled him to act as he did. Unlike the King though, he could lose his
position and honors should he fail in upholding that central goal of the Habsburg
monarchy. That added further pressure to ensure that not only domains under his
control remained so, but that his own realm of New Spain did not fall prey to
foreign invasion. As many letters between the viceroy and the king indicated, it
was imperative that Albuquerque kept his coasts safe from English predators. For
a monarchy o en deprived of reserves of gold and silver, these two
responsibilities: recapturing Jamaica and preserving New Spain, threatened to
utterly ruin their treasuries.
However, Albuquerque committed himself to disavow money from the
King's estate to fund or manage the defense, and from incurring higher than
normal costs for the King.51 He, therefore, had two goals of seemingly equal
importance: preserve these provinces for Spain, and preserve her treasury. This
signiﬁcantly shackled his ability to act decisively and in the end, Albuquerque
came to the conclusion that his most important responsibility was keeping royal
debts to a minimum. He eventually decided to pay for arms on his own accord to
defend New Spain but made no such eﬀort for Jamaica. Moreover, he also shared
the belief of the Duke of Veragua that the land could provide for defense.
Albuquerque believed that a scorched earth guerrilla-style campaign could work
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to defend his dominion of New Spain, by cutting oﬀ the enemy from supplies and
harassing them constantly. He also believed that other European forces at this
time did not possess a pilot skilled enough to land at Veracruz. This tactic was
both cheap and eﬀective at protecting New Spain. This thinking was music to
King Philip IV’s ears. It allowed Philip IV to rationalize not dispatching
assistance from Spain because his viceroy had assured him it was unnecessary.
Of course, any serious resistance ﬁrst came from those on the island itself.
Under Isassi's command and, as the Duke of Veragua had predicted, such
resistance was centered on a guerrilla campaign in the mountains. One of
Venables' orders during his brief stay on the island highlights the style of
ﬁghting that the Spanish were carrying out, and continued to carry out during
their 5-year resistance. He ordered "that no private Soldier should hence-forward
go forth to kill cows alone, but that commanded parties should constantly be sent
forth to fetch in cows for the Army's necessary supply" because "the Men [were]
sometimes slain by stragling [sic]."52 From fairly early on then, the Spanish were
willing and able to participate in small scale ambushes on small numbers of
Englishmen. While not devastating to the thousands-strong English force, it was
both demoralizing and fear-inducing. It is noteworthy that these English were
the same troops who, while on Santo Domingo, had been startled by crabs and
ﬁreﬂies fearing they were Spanish defenders.53 Moreover, the state of the English
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forces could not aﬀord more death. Disease, mostly in the form of dysentery, and
famine were killing oﬀ large numbers of English troops. Venables himself le the
island on account of illness on 15 July 1655, leaving command to Major-General
Fortescue. Worse still for the English, diseases did not respect rank, and so
Fortescue himself had passed not long a er Venables' departure. From that point
forward, the English forces were led intermittently by Edward D'Oyley, formerly
a colonel in Venables' command. His command was interrupted by the occasional
arrival of a more ‘republican’ general from England. In any event, the English
were only strong in number at this point. It's hard from the sources available to
ascertain what the actual ﬁghting capacity of the English was but it was far less
than reported amounts. The best estimate was that they numbered around 2,500
men in total, bolstered by a ﬂuctuating number of ships oﬀ the coast.
Despite the debilitating eﬀects of sickness running through their men, the
English were able to realize a great fear of Spanish oﬃcials. Once the English
had established themselves in Jamaica, some Spanish-American oﬃcials feared
that this was going to directly result in attacks on their cities and towns. In
October 1655, the Vice-Admiral and Commander of the Jamaica Station, William
Goodson was authorized by Cromwell to attack Spanish shipping in the region
and capture or sink any ships he encountered. He went a bit further than those
orders and laid siege to Santa Marta, which lies in present-day Colombia.54 On
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Company, 1900, 161.
54
Noël W. Sainsbury, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, Preserved In... the Public Record
Oﬃce...: America and West Indies, 1675-1676, Also Addenda, 1574-1674, HM Stationery Oﬃce, 1893,
99.

42
October 3rd Goodson and his ships approached the city alerting the inhabitants of
their presence. What followed was the stereotypical English raid. A er an
exchange of cannon ﬁre between the English ships and Spanish ramparts the
English were able to sail into the port. A brief skirmish (no longer than a
half-hour according to one participant), gave the people of Santa Marta time to
withdraw into the surrounding hills and forest along with their valuables.55
Goodson demanded a ransom of 2000 pounds for the city, however, a er 14 days
the promised sum was not delivered. Fearing that staying any longer increased
the chances of a Spanish relief force arriving, Goodson and his men departed
Santa Marta. Before doing so, they burnt some buildings in the town for good
measure.
The raid produced little material gain for the English aside from 32 pieces
of ordinance and as such was met with apathy from Cromwell and the
Protectorate. It made Major Robert Sedgwicke question the validity of this style
of attack in the West Indies. Sent to take up command a er Fortescue’s death, he
remarked to the Admiralty, "this kind of marooning cruising West India trade of
plundering and burning of towns, though it hath been long practised in these
parts, yet is not honorable for a princely navy...56 While dishonorable, this small
raid and others like it, were tremendously eﬀective in keeping Spanish forces
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contained to their cities and ports. So, Major Sedgwick continued in that letter,
“...perhaps it may be tolerated at present." Ever unsure about when the next
attack was coming and how large a force was being assembled for that purpose,
Spanish governors felt uneasy about dispatching men across the Caribbean to
assist people they had never come in contact with and had no relationship with
outside of their allegiance to the same king. The safer choice was to consolidate
their defense and dig in. What was cast as Spanish cowardice and later Spanish
weakness was actually a conscious Spanish-American defense policy. If it meant
leaving Isassi and the other Spanish Jamaicans to their own devices, the other
Spanish-American oﬃcials were willing to pay that price.
All the while, Isassi established his base of operations in the mountain of
Manatines. Initially, he withdrew to Caobana in the southwest of the island near
the modern-day Black River but decided a more central location better served his
purpose. Once there he claimed that the English pursued him. In the ensuing
battle, one of very few on the island, the Spanish were able to hold their ground,
but at the loss of a substantial number of men. Given the trouble of sending
reinforcements, losses like these were particularly devastating for the Spanish
Resistance. Isassi's brother, Francisco Leiva Isassi, the Lieutenant Governor of
Santiago de Cuba, noted in 1659 the apparent ease with which the English
resupplied and reinforced their numbers from the Leeward Islands, New
England, and Virginia.
However it should have been just as easy for the Spanish to send such
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reinforcements given their numerous possessions in the areas. Recognizing this,
Isassi wrote voraciously demanding such supplies. The response came in the
form of the ﬁrst relief sent from Cartagena de Indies in October of 1655. Despite
claims by historians that colonial leaders were sluggish and lacked any agency to
operate outside of royal orders, Governor Pedro Zapata was able to coordinate
and send: powder, balls, cord, lances, hoes, machetes, spades, salt, cassava, maize,
wine, and vinegar. Notably, the aid was delivered to Isassi at the south of the
island. Isassi felt that resupplying in the south oﬀered the best chances of
success, though it was not a widely held belief. Zapata's actions stood out as an
example for colonial oﬃcials elsewhere to follow.
As for the makeup of his men at the start of the resistance, he notiﬁed the
king in 1656 that he was in charge of the naturales, the Spanish born and raised in
Jamaica, as well as the blacks on the island. This included free-blacks, the
maroons, and still enslaved Africans. While these were all Blacks of African birth
or descent, they represented diﬀerent social groups and identities. However, as
the guerilla campaign continued, they can all be considered groups of the Black
Resistance. O en when Isassi took an account of his forces he recorded these
groups separately from the Euro-American/ Spanish-Jamaicans but assured other
authorities that he was, nonetheless, in ﬁrm command of them. Isassi may not
have been intentionally lying, but it is quite clear that the Black Resistance was
made up of three autonomous communities, each with their own interests. While
these interests were o en pro-Spanish and anti-English, one should not mistake
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this for obedience to Isassi. Their chief interest was the preservation of their
autonomous communities. Isassi’s depiction of them as a separate unit in his
command, along with English hopes that they would ‘turn on their former
masters’ relegates them to secondary ﬁgures in this history. However, threats on
their autonomy thrust the Black Resistance to the frontlines of the conquest of
Jamaica. In short, they were the deciding factor in Isassi’s reconquest of Jamaica.
The very plausibility of success depended on them.
While still in the south of Jamaica, Isassi was also able to secure more
small victories over the English. According to Francisco Leiva Isassi, they had
burnt English fortiﬁcations at Anaya and Guanabacoa. However successful
Isassi's guerilla raids were in demoralizing a sick English force, they were never
enough to totally recover the island. Documentary evidence and the
historiography all acknowledge that a ﬂeet was needed to completely retake the
island. Moreover, they were not sustainable. They relied on two shaky
foundations. One was the local knowledge of the terrain; the longer the English
spent on the island, the less of an advantage it was for him. The second
foundation was the support of the Black Resistance. Whatever ‘control’ Isassi
claimed over that group was voluntary and could at any point be withdrawn. So
while he may have had success early on, from the end of 1655 onwards, his role on
the island dramatically changed. Going forward Isassi was conﬁrmed as a
resistance leader, not a reconquistador; a change welcomed by King Philip IV.
One of the issues regarding the study of this subject is that
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mistranslations and omissions, intentional or not, become regarded as truth in its
history. Worse still, in their acceptance as truth, they are repeated without a
second thought of further investigation. In this vein, it has been understood that
when King Philip received word that the English seized Jamaica he was gripped
with anguish. Hume, in The Court of Philip IV, claimed that the King wrote that
this occasion was, "the ﬁnal ruin of this monarchy."57 Latimer, in Buccaneers of the
Caribbean, cites this quote along with other claims by Hume that people were
cursing in the streets, though Hume provided no such citation for that claim. For
the above quote however, Hume cited the letters of King Philip IV to Sor Maria, a
miraculous nun and his conﬁdant. Further inspection of those letters reveals
that, as of the date of that letter (30 June 1655), the king did not have news that
the English seized Jamaica. That portion of the letter goes as follows, "England
wants war with us, because, although there is no certainty so far, the great clues
that we have are of two large armadas which they bring in the seas, One has gone
into the Indies to infest them, and the other is kept in these coasts waiting for the
galleons; a matter which if it happens would be the ﬁnal ruin of this Monarchy."58
In its full form, one sees the reality behind the quote. Yes, Philip IV was
concerned, however, his concern was that the English may capture the silver
galleons returning from America. Not yet aware of the English presence on the
island, the King feared the possible loss of income which the galeones brought.
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This fear guided the Monarchy throughout the remainder of the decade, and not
unfoundedly. Blake, the admiral of the ﬂeet waiting for the galeones mentioned
above, eventually delayed the return of those ships in his daring 1657 attack on
Santa Cruz de Tenerife. King Philip IV's response, or lack thereof, to the English
invasion of Jamaica, must be viewed through this perspective; he feared for and
desired the safety of the ﬂotas and galeones. Control of Jamaica was thus
subsumed into this larger fear. With this fear in mind, we must come to better
understand King Philip's, as well as the royal apparatus surrounding him, role in
reconquering Jamaica.
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The Failure of the First Relief
King Philip's letters during 1656 to Isassi, Alburquerque, and Pedro
Zapata elucidate in no uncertain terms his approach to the developing situation
in Jamaica. As for Isassi, King Philip expected his role to be that of a thorn in the
English side, and one that prevented the military occupation from becoming a
colonial settlement. His order to Isassi was, "not only to make a very rigorous
diversion against the English to keep them continually with arms in hand,
but...attempt to dislodge them...compelling them to embark on their ships and
leave Jamaica…"59 While it may appear from this letter that King Philip expected
Isassi to completely evict the English from the island, he qualiﬁed that
expectation by asking only that Isassi “attempt” to evict them. He did fully expect
Isassi to act as a diversion, and Isassi's subsequent actions indicate that this was
what he understood his role to be, even if that meant shirking attempts at
completely evicting the English. The belief went that if a presence could be
maintained on the island, a ﬂeet could be dispatched once the European situation
had improved.
In his letters from the same year to the Duke of Albuquerque, King Philip
IV explained both the purpose of Isassi's resistance and his incoming relief, as
well as where that relief must come from. Echoing his letter to Isassi, King Philip
explained to Albuquerque that the relief was suﬃcient to maintain a presence on
the island, "since [they] cannot dislodge them from all the ports and land that
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they occupy in Jamaica, at least in the meantime [they] can maintain war until the
appropriate time for another force executing it with the greatest rigor."60 Again,
from the perspective of the Crown, it was the best use of resources to keep a
force capable of harassing the English until a more opportune time came along to
root them out entirely. This perspective also reinforced the notion that it was
unnecessary for the mother country to send direct relief at this juncture.
In a follow-up letter, King Philip ordered the governors of all the
Windward Islands to send infantry and supplies to Jamaica. Each island was
ordered to send varying amounts of men depending on the population of the
island and the risk of attack on their doorstep. Places like Santiago de Cuba, the
closest to Jamaica, were not expected to send as many men as they were at great
risk and could ill aﬀord to do so. Even more notable was the exclusion of
Cartagena. Fairly close to Jamaica, but more important to the Crown than
Santiago de Cuba, Cartagena de Indies was no longer expected nor required to
send aid of any kind to Jamaica. In fact, it was undesirable for them to do so. The
varying requirements again illustrate the Iberian and Spanish-American
priorities; protect the important ports ﬁrst, recover Jamaica second. Of course,
there was perhaps no more important location than Spain itself. Also exempt
from sending aid at this time, the King summarized it as such "the relief from
[Spain], is for a total lack of means, because in the present state what is cared
most about in the Indies, is to ﬁnd the English, with feet on Jamaica, impeding
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the commerce of all the Windward Islands with the coasts of [South America] and
New Spain and running great risk to the Spanish ﬂeets and galleons around
Jamaica." With very limited means at his disposal due to incessant continental
conﬂict, King Philip was primarily focused on the protection of commerce. Any
relief from Spain needed to be directed towards that purpose, rather than direct
intervention on Jamaica itself. Thus, the English presence on Jamaica was a
problem insofar as it was a threat to the Spanish silver ﬂeets and the commerce
they carried:
the utmost importance and convenience would be followed by restoring it
by expelling the English to ensure the passage of the ﬂeets and galleons
that so fervently have to go through one and another part of that island
and also to ensure the passage of the merchant frigates between the
Windward Islands and of the coasts of the mainland that are really
[emphasis added] oppressed with the English ships having their fortiﬁed
ports on Jamaica.61
For the Spanish (both Iberian and American), recovering Jamaica was never about
Jamaica, it was about the threat to their commerce that the English posed by
being there. The Monarchy searched for any possible means to circumvent that
problem without expending energy on direct reconquest. Philip IV explained
that, by ordering that the relief came from the Indies, it was more expedient to
accomplish the recovery of that island.62 If Isassi and his men could cause a
signiﬁcant enough distraction, the English were forced to stay in Jamaica and
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unable to attack other Caribbean ports. In that same letter, he complained that it
was going to take a year to get relief from Spain to Jamaica by utilizing the
galeones and ﬂotas. Such a long investment of time, with so uncertain a return,
was out of the question. King Philip had far too many more urgent matters closer
to home to attend to at that time.
Meanwhile, it appeared that Isassi was not providing enough of a
distraction for the English. Vice-Admiral Goodson was once again fulﬁlling his
orders to go on the oﬀensive and attack the Spanish. He dispatched 5 ships to
loiter about Portobelo and Cartagena de Indias to await the ﬂota carrying silver
between the two cities. He also dispatched 10 ships to Hispaniola to capture the
galeones. However, these ships failed to ﬁnd the galeones and were instead forced
to pursue a stationary target. Eventually, they settled on Rio de la Hacha. Much
like the raid on Santa Marta a year earlier, it accomplished very little in terms of
plunder. Undeterred, the ships passed by Santa Marta, and eventually made their
way to the great city of Cartagena. Upon seeing six ships in the harbor there, the
English feared that a force was being assembled to recover Jamaica and beat a
hasty retreat to the island. While they were mistaken in this assumption, their
actions reveal two things; one, that Spanish fears of increased English raids were
not unfounded, and two, that the English still respected Spanish forces in the
region.
As for the Spanish, they are o en criticized for appearing to be lethargic
when refusing to move quickly to defend and recover Jamaica. Yet, when the
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Spanish received reports from captives that the English were preparing for a raid,
they were not foolish for believing those reports and acting on them. Raids like
Goodson's and later Myngs' justiﬁed the fear which kept Spanish ships docked or
otherwise close to home. Likewise, the English, despite having 10 ships of their
own, still felt they were no match for the six Spanish ships and their forces
within the city. Though the English themselves preached that the Spaniards were
no match for them, that laziness had made them ineﬀective ﬁghters, and that
God was on their side, they recognized there was still some might le in Spanish
guns. Furthermore, the English reacted in the same way as the Spanish when
they thought an enemy invasion was imminent. They also sought to protect their
colony and the opportunity it provided.
So while raids on Spanish ports may have been an eﬀective defense
through oﬀense, they were not the means by which Jamaica eventually became a
proﬁtable island. The English did have experience in setting up proﬁtable
colonies in the Caribbean though. By the 1640s colonies like Barbados were
becoming economic engines through the production of sugar, linked to the
Transatlantic Slave Trade. Leadership in London and Jamaica sought to replicate
that success in Jamaica as soon as possible, even if the island was not entirely
paciﬁed. The threat which they posed to the Spanish was not suﬃcient enough
justiﬁcation for their presence in Jamaica. A colony modeled on Barbados was
the desired future for Jamaica. However, this proved extraordinarily diﬃcult to
do in the 1650s, the Spanish resistance notwithstanding.
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First, as has been mentioned, the English did not have the technological
nor biological means to ﬁght oﬀ tropical diseases. The eventual commander on
the island, Colonel D’Oyley was himself sick in 1655.63 Compounding the issue
was the fact that the English troops on the island were constantly ﬁghting oﬀ
starvation. In one letter to Cromwell, Major Sedgwicke sums up the problems
facing the English as such,
it is certain we have enemies both of Spaniards and Blacks in the island,
and they watch for an opportunity of our men; as for planters we have not
above one family settled, if one amongst us, neither do I expect any from
our English colonies, till God give health amongst us. Here hath come
down to us from many of the windward islands divers people, with
intentions of sitting down with us, but at their coming hither, either fall
sick and die, or are so aﬀrighted and dismayed, as that although to their
much impoverishing, yet will not be persuaded to stay with us.
Jamaica was struggling to draw in honest planting families for those reasons
mentioned above. If diseases did not wipe out a family, then the Spanish or Black
population on the island would. At this point, all news coming from the island
was negative and life on the island was seen as more of a punishment than an
opportunity. In that letter, Sedgwicke also gets at another key component in this
history, that of the Black communities on the island.
Isassi had indicated that same year that he was in control of the whole
populous which had existed before English occupation. Yet, English accounts of
the time indicate that, at least from their perspective, this was not the case. Two
Spanish prisoners were reported to have stated: “that the negroes, that are not of
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the Spanish party, are some 200; but knoweth not in what part of the island they
are.”64 Unfortunately, no primary evidence exists which was created by the Black
Resistance, so we can only speculate what their motives were, but it seems likely
that the preservation of their freedom was chief among them. The Maroons,
which made up part of such Resistance, had already established their own
settlements before the English occupation of Jamaica and had even erected a
fortress in the northwest of the island. From a base of operations like that, they
were able to swi ly attack Englishmen searching for Spaniards and then vanish
back into the landscape. This was an advantage which they maintained well into
the 18th century.
1656 in Europe
If the Spanish position in the Caribbean could be described as defensive,
much the same could be said for their position in Europe. Ongoing war with
France in Flanders and Italy, rebellions in Catalonia and Portugal, and an English
ﬂeet oﬀ the coast of Cadiz required King Philip's full attention. Fully aware that
there were more open battlefronts than could be managed, the Monarchy knew it
needed to seek peace somewhere. The Duke of Medina de las Torres, Ramiro
Núñez de Guzmán, felt that Austria and England provided natural and traditional
allies for Spain. However, he was at that time in the opposition, and the ruling
clique headed by Luis de Haro supported a cessation of hostilities with France. A
successful defense of Valenciennes in the Spanish Netherlands in July, led by the
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King's son Juan de Austria is believed to have convinced Philip IV that he may
prevail over France. His letters with Sor Maria betray that sentiment as it appears
Philip IV felt the situation remained quite hopeless, or at least, still requiring
divine intervention.65 Nonetheless, the ruling faction at court felt the need to
maintain the war with France until they had a clear advantage and then join in
league with them as the dominant Catholic powers in Europe. In 1656 then,
peace was not sought a er on the French front, but as always, it was desired on
the Portuguese front.
That ongoing rebellion, part of the general crisis of the 1640s, was acutely
damaging to the Habsburg reputation. Recall that the House of Habsburg called
on its monarchs to defend all its constituent realms in perpetuity. Independence,
or the concession of a kingdom, principality, duchy, or county, was severely
disparaged by the Habsburgs. Therefore, Philip felt it was his duty to preserve
Portugal as a dominion of Spain for the good of his heir and his people. However,
the King also recognized that as of 1656, Spain was unable to squash the rebellion
in Portugal without external aid. Enter Charles Stuart, exiled King of England,
Scotland and Ireland.
From King Philip IV's perspective, there were two Englands to bargain
with. One led by Cromwell in London, and the other led by Charles Stuart in his
mobile court-in-exile. Earlier, Spain had sided with Parliamentary England. In
April of 1652, Alonso de Cárdenas had been authorized by King Philip to treat
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with the Parliament of England to ensure that peace treaties made with the
monarchy continued to be upheld by whichever form of government came next.66
Indeed, the following year Spain recognized the Protectorate of Cromwell,
becoming the ﬁrst nation to do so. However, by 1656 the situation was drastically
diﬀerent. Cromwell's provocation, embodied in the Western Design, and the
ongoing persecution of Catholics, had pushed Spain towards the restoration of
Charles. The former ambassador to England, Alonso de Cardenas circulated a
book around the court in which he laid out just how duplicitous Cromwell had
been in planning and carrying out the attack on Hispaniola and Jamaica.67 No
further agreements could be reached between these two nations in light of such
information. Thus, foreign policy was directed sharply away from Cromwell and
towards his opposite number, Charles. As for Charles, he found that his family in
the Netherlands and France were unwilling to shelter and support him and so he
was pushed into the arms of Spain. Consequently, the two monarchs agreed to
the Treaty of Brussels in April of 1656.
Among its provisions and secret articles regarding religion, the treaty
centered on an exchange of services. Spain's major assistance to Charles was an
article requiring 4,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and an unclear sum of money to be

Consejo de Estados, “Copia de La Plenipotencia Conferida Por El Rey Felipe IV a Alonso de
Cárdenas Para Tratar Con El Parlamento de Inglaterra,” Tratado de Madrid Firmado Por España
E Inglaterra El 23 de Mayo de 1667, April 27, 1652, ESTADO,2778,Parte 1a,Exp.7, Archivo
Histórico Nacional, Madrid, España.
67
Alonso de Cárdenas, La Revolución Inglesa (1638-1656): Relación Del Estado Presente de Las Cosas
de Inglaterra Deducida Desde El Principio de Sus Movimientos Hasta El Año de 1656. Escriuiola D.
Alonso de Cárdenas, Enbaxador de La Majestad Cathólica, Biblioteca Nacional Hispánica, 17th
Century.
66

57
used to restore him to the Crown of England. In exchange for this aid, Charles
was expected to enlist men and ships to ﬁght for a term of 5 years against
Portugal and renounce his alliance with the Braganzas. This was not all that
Charles promised Spain in this treaty though. Most critically to the evolving
situation in Jamaica, Charles, "promise[d] and oblige[d] that he [would] not
consent to his subjects making new plantations in the West Indies, nor occupy
islands in them, nor ports in Tierra Firme, and that he will restore everything the
English have occupied from the year 1630 onwards, so in America as in any other
part of the world, and particularly in the time that Oliver Cromwell has governed
with the title of Protector."68 Of course this is an obvious allusion to Jamaica
without outright admittance of the fact. This article is therefore critical to
understanding the Iberian perspective on reclaiming Jamaica.
Most scholarship regards this treaty as one driven by the singular vision of
a monarch in exile, and as such inherently duplicitous. At this time though, the
Crown had no reason to suspect that King Charles was going to be peacefully
asked to reclaim his throne and subsequently, renege on the treaty. They,
therefore, approached colonial policy with an understanding that regardless of
their eﬀorts, they could achieve their desired ends by restoring Charles II to the
throne of England. Why expend desperately needed arms, munitions, and men to
reclaim an island across an ocean when a diplomatic treaty can ensure the same
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result? The more prudent use of those same resources was to focus on King
Charles II's restoration. This oﬀered the potential to secure a useful ally against
France, the return of Jamaica, the subjugation of Portugal, and of course, peace
with England. If we look back at the letters from King Philip to the colonial
oﬃcials through the lens of this treaty, it's clear that he was of this mindset. In
his letters with Sor Maria, King Philip o en emphasizes how thinly stretched he
believed Spanish forces to be. Dispatching soldiers so far from home was too
abstract for a king so bound to the reality of a kingdom constantly at war with its
neighbors and itself. Through the restoration of Charles II, King Philip IV could
alleviate problems both near and far. This outlook colors all of Philip IV’s
subsequent decisions regarding Jamaica up until his own death in 1665. Only
within the context of Atlantic history does the Treaty of Brussels take a
tremendously important role in the ultimate failure of the Spanish to reclaim
Jamaica.
1657 in the Caribbean
Until the ultimate return of Charles II to the throne of England, a
presence needed to be maintained in Jamaica. This message was reiterated by
numerous Caribbean oﬃcials including the Duke of Albuquerque in a letter to
Cristobal Arnaldo Isassi in March of 1657. In that same letter, Albuquerque also
informed Isassi of the threat which the English posed to Santiago de Cuba, "[The
English] are hourly awaiting their ﬂeet which they say is bringing orders to
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invade this fortress of Santiago de Cuba."69 The threat which the English posed
in 1656 and which had resulted in much paralysis on the part of the Spanish
showed no signs of going away in 1657. However, the Spanish were able to shake
oﬀ the sluggishness which had plagued them a year earlier, and, in late July 1657,
the relief force which King Philip IV had ordered in 1656 ﬁnally arrived in
Jamaica. This force of roughly 400 men and supplies played a deﬁning role not
just in 1657 but in the remaining years of Spanish eﬀorts to recover the island.
They supposedly represented the combined might of Hispaniola, Havana, Puerto
Rico, and New Spain. Ultimately, their defeat at Las Chorreras in the north of
Jamaica eﬀectively marked the end of large, full-scale conﬂict between the
English and Spanish. In a sense, it heralded the endgame.
Organizing such a force from the scattered dominions of the Caribbean
required a rendezvous point before continuing on towards Jamaica. For better or
worse, and really for worse, that point was Santiago de Cuba, the city controlled
by Don Pedro Bayona y Villanueva. As previously mentioned, Bayona was less
than keen on rapidly assembling and deploying forces that could undermine
other lucrative endeavors. He was even less enthusiastic about sending away
detachments that could provide defense for Cuba. Unsurprisingly, when the men
from across the Caribbean landed in Santiago de Cuba they were delayed for a
period of time which Isassi considered unacceptable. Moreover, he felt that
Bayona y Villanueva had kept the strongest men and that his ally Albuquerque
"Letter from the Duke of Albuquerque to Cristobal Arnaldo Isassi, March 1657," in Frank
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had not even bothered to send ﬁt men for his cause. Isassi had signiﬁcant
grounds to lodge such a complaint against Bayona, as roughly 570 men had been
assembled at Santiago de Cuba, and only 400 of those men made it to Jamaica. As
a last insult to Isassi, Bayona y Villanueva appointed Juan de los Reyes as the
head of this contingent on dubious authority.
To say that Juan de los Reyes cut a divisive ﬁgure is an understatement.
First, his introduction as leader of the relief force came as a surprise to Isassi as
Bayona y Villanueva had not sent prior word to Isassi. According to Cundall in
Jamaica Under the Spaniards, upon meeting this supposed commander, Isassi
informed Reyes that he should turn over command to his nephew. This is said to
be the catalyst for the deterioration of their relationship if such a thing existed at
all between the two men, and the breakdown of Isassi's resistance campaign.
However, Cundall provides no evidence to support such a claim and seems to be
relating a commonly used excuse for the coming dissension between Isassi and
Reyes. Its prevalence in English historiography is likely due in part to its role in
furthering the broader narrative of Spanish incompetence. What appears more
likely is that Bayona y Villanueva always intended for Reyes to be antagonistic
towards Isassi and to challenge his authority. The man who should have been
commander of these forces, one Captain Salinas, sent by Albuquerque, was not
permitted to leave Santiago de Cuba.70 Bayona y Villanueva did not respect Isassi
as a governor and especially not as a soldier. By sending Reyes as head of the
"Inquiry of the Council of Indies, 1659," in Frank Cundall, and Joseph Luckert Pietersz, Jamaica
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relief force, he attempted to neutralize Isassi's authority and thus validate his
disrespect.71
More recent scholarship, such as Schmitt’s aforementioned article, has
shi ed discourse away from petty jealousies as the source of conﬂict. However, it
still essentially maintains that jealousy, in this case, jealousy of proﬁtable illicit
trade relationships, was responsible for the failure to retake Jamaica. Neither
Schmitt nor Cundall make use of what may have been the actual source of
conﬂict; the orders Bayona y Villanueva gave to Reyes before his departure to
Jamaica. In these orders, conﬁscated by the English a er the defeat at Las
Chorreras, Bayona y Villanueva ﬁrst orders that Reyes obeys Isassi in all things
that relate to the service of the king (i.e. combatting the English). If Bayona y
Villanueva truly wanted that to be the case though, the document should end
there. As it is though, that is the ﬁrst of many orders Reyes was supposed to
follow. Bayona y Villanueva continues speciﬁcally commanding that Reyes
should avoid long marches before conﬂict so as to avoid tiring his own men, “and
to be sure, that it be at such a distance from the enemy, that you may be able to
make war with him without making of long marches...And the governor and
serjeant-major are to have special care, that the soldiers be not weary with
marching when they come to ﬁght…”72 It is clear that Bayona y Villanueva felt
such orders were imperative based on his own experience as a soldier in
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Catalonia and Italy. Later in the document he orders Reyes to treat the English
civilly to induce mass surrenders, something he noted had worked in Catalonia.73
Notably, Bayona y Villanueva did not provide Reyes with a course of action
should his orders conﬂict with those of Isassi.
Thus, the relief that arrived on the island found itself consumed by the
dispute between the two men. Isassi does deserve some credit in attempting to
blunt the eﬀects of the argument becoming either a full-scale civil war between
the two factions, or a complete mutiny. Beyond their personal diﬀerences, Isassi
and Reyes disagreed about the best course of action and the purpose of this relief
force on the island. When the contingent arrived in La Maguana (near
present-day Ocho Rios) some men remained there to guard the provisions that
accompanied them. The rest of the force was intended to accompany Isassi and
his men towards the interior of the island to camp and create ambushes. This was
Isassi's preferred method of attack and one that, recall, brought him success in
the early days of resistance. Reyes on the other hand sternly disagreed with this
course of action. Bayona y Villanueva had warned him to avoid such marches. He
wrote to Isassi that success in the interior of the island was, "impossible."74 The
issue was further compounded by the hardships which the men experienced in
marching from La Maguana towards points inland. In testimony given to the
Council of Indies two years later, Isassi's brother indicated that the relief force
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did not have enough food to last them ﬁ een days in Jamaica.
Taking advantage of the disgruntled state of the men, Reyes demanded a
Council of War to permit his return to the supplies at La Maguana. Isassi,
wanting to avoid mutiny while still accomplishing his central mission, agreed to
allow Reyes and some of the men to return to La Maguana. Isassi continued
towards the interior and south of the island while ordering that Reyes move the
supplies to Baycani (in the vicinity of Ocho Rios). However, Bayona y Villanueva
had instructed Reyes to “to choose out a place upon that coast, from whence
correspondency may be kept with this city, and to fortify it very well, and leave a
guard of soldiers therein, and to make huts for the sick and wounded.”75 Reyes
therefore ignored Isassi’s orders and instead constructed a stockade around the
supplies at La Maguana.
Meanwhile, the English were trying to consolidate the villages and areas
in their control. Under D'Oyley's command and with the Lord Protector's aid,
they attempted to make Jamaica a proﬁtable settlement. While Cromwell tried to
convince settlers from other Caribbean islands and New England to move to
Jamaica, D'Oyley attempted to induce the soldiers into settling down and
planting. That endeavor was paused when the word was received through a
captured Portuguese sailor that the Spanish relief had indeed landed in the north
of the island. D'Oyley himself boarded the Indian to lead the forces which
departed from Cagway on October 24th. 6 days later, they landed two miles from
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the Spanish camp at La Maguana near Las Chorreras and began to march
towards the Spanish position. Along the way, they encountered one of the famous
Spanish ambuscadoes which, despite past success, was ineﬀective that day. Isassi
later bemoaned the futility of Reyes' ambush and subsequent abandonment of all
defensive trenches between the English and their stockade.76
Despite not actually having been present at the battle, Isassi believed that
those earthwork defenses could have held out against the advancing English and
prevented the disaster to come. Whether or not that was true became irrelevant
as the English made their way to the stockade protecting the Spanish provisions.
Understanding the tenuous situation in which they found themselves, Isassi
ordered that should the English ﬁnd the Spanish provisions and defeat seem
imminent, the provisions should be burnt. This was an unfortunate necessity to
prevent the English from becoming stronger at direct Spanish expense. Once
again Reyes dismissed that order and determined to stand his ground at Las
Chorreras. According to D'Oyley's account of the battle, the English forces were
able to breach the fortiﬁcation a er a 45-minute gunﬁght along the walls by
using their hatchets. In addition to seizing the munitions there, the English were
also able to capture the former governor, Don Francisco de Proenza.
Unfortunately, while en route to New Spain, he died aboard the ship upon which
the English had placed him. With the death of the last pre-English governor,
Spanish control of Jamaica was truly no more.
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While Spanish control of the island had ceased to exist, the Spanish
presence on the island remained, though greatly reduced. In light of his blatant
insubordination, Reyes and a large majority of the Spanish forces on the island
returned to Cuba. Isassi asked that he be kept there in some form of conﬁnement
or as an outright prisoner. Unsurprisingly, Bayona did not honor this request and
instead sent Reyes to Madrid to explain the devastating defeat. Isassi was
understandably incensed upon hearing this news as it meant that Reyes' account
of events reached the king before his own depiction of 30 October could. As these
oﬃcials saw 1657 draw to a close, they well understood that a herculean task
awaited them the following year.
Now while the Spanish had suﬀered a catastrophic defeat, they were still
succeeding in preventing the English from eﬀectively settling the island and
making it proﬁtable. Uncooperative governors in the Leeward Islands, Virginia
and New England refused to send planter families to settle the island, so it
remained little more than a military outpost. In February of 1657 D’Oyley had
remarked that the Spanish presence on the island, coupled with reinforcements
from New Spain, “interrupt[s] our work of planting, to attend them.”77
Additionally, D’Oyley was also cautious about engaging in or endorsing
privateering at this time, displaying an unusual amount of caution. He appeared
to be preparing the island for the end of martial law and seeking to transition to a
peaceful civilian government.78 Moreover, the constantly ﬂuctuating situation of
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English politics meant that the soldiers who were ‘expendable’ in 1654-55 and
thus shipped oﬀ on the Western Design, were suddenly very much in need back
in Europe.
1657: The European Perspective
While the Spanish forces were largely crushed at Las Chorreras, events on
the continent provided opportunities for optimism. For Spain, and King Philip IV
in particular, 1657 was a complicated year punctuated by victories, defeats,
miracles, and foreboding. While the main theaters of his attention continued to
be Portugal, Catalonia, Flanders, and Italy, new ones opened up in the Canary
Islands, Central Europe, and his own Court. In the Canaries, the English raid on
Santa Cruz de Tenerife posed the greatest threat to the Spanish silver ﬂeet since
Piet Hein three decades earlier while the death of Ferdinand III, Holy Roman
Emperor, had implications which resounded far beyond 1657. Finally, a er the
campaign season of 1657 had drawn to a close, King Philip celebrated the birth of
his ﬁrst son in twenty-eight years and the ﬁrst viable heir in over a decade.
To understand the complexities which colored 1657, a brief overview of
that year's campaign season of the Franco-Spanish war is necessary, as it
continued to be the main source of conﬂict. In February 1657 King Philip
considered Italy most important and most in need of relief.79 To his surprise and
beneﬁt, the French army started slowly despite the return of warm weather.
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Indeed, it was actually the Spanish forces which mobilized ﬁrst and le their
winter camp. The French did eventually get moving and put the city of
Alessandria to siege. Lying roughly midway between Turin and Milan,
Alessandria in French hands could provide a launchpad for future strikes both in
the Duchy of Milan, and the city itself. King Philip seemed keenly aware of this
fact and wrote that its loss could result in, "the loss of all the State."80 Possibly
because they had been on the move ﬁrst, the Spanish army was in the same area
and able to come to the relief of the city. The region which had so plagued Philip
IV managed to resist French domination for another year.
Portugal meanwhile continued to be a knife in Spain's ﬁgurative, and
geographically literal, back. Despite a campaign season cut short due to heat,
Spanish forces were dealt a signiﬁcant blow with the loss of Olivenza. While they
achieved victory and secured Mourao, the trade-oﬀ was imbalanced. Philip IV
still held out hope that through prayer and arms he could make the Portuguese
resubmit and rejoin the Crown of Spain. Such adherence to what scholars
considered a lost cause, while not disastrous in 1657, was distracting. Firmly
upholding the Habsburg belief in the union of all dominions in perpetuity, Philip
IV continued to siphon valuable men and supplies to this fool's errand. This
became all the more pressing as events unfolded in Flanders and the Canaries.
In 1656, Spain and the exiled King Charles II had reached an agreement in
which Charles provided immediate men-at-arms to ﬁght in Flanders, and Spain
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was to return the favor at a later date to assist Charles in reclaiming his throne.
Meanwhile, through his Western Design, Cromwell had removed himself from
Spanish favor and the Treaty of Brussels had propelled him further into the orbit
of France. The result was the Treaty of Paris which reads as a mirror of the
Brussels treaty a year prior. Cromwell's England was tasked with supplying ships
to France and in turn, France was meant to help ensure that Charles never
regained his throne. The key component of the treaty was that the combined
Franco-Protectorate forces go on campaign in Flanders with the goal of
capturing Dunkirk. This was intended to drive Charles from his exile in Flanders,
cut oﬀ the logical staging ground for any Royalist invasion, and to cease the
predation of the Dunkirker privateers on English shipping. Thus, 1657 should be
considered a resumption of the English Civil War. Royalist and Parliamentarian
forces once again squared oﬀ on the battleﬁeld, contributing considerably to
their allied causes.
The weight of English forces on both sides impacted the larger conﬂict in
the years to come. In 1657, it was Charles II's forces who carried the day and
brought success to the court of Philip IV. At St. Ghislain, English and Irish forces
under the command of James, Duke of York, and the Army of Flanders led by Don
Juan secured victory in that city thereby blocking a path to Brussels. Meanwhile,
the Condé was able to successfully relieve Cambrai from the Comte de Turenne
and prevent a hasty collapse of Spanish power there. However, there were losses
at Montmedy and Mardyck which the King lamented over. The latter came to be

69
particularly disastrous as it placed Anglo-French troops in striking distance of
the all-important Dunkirk. As with so much of the Franco-Spanish War, and
conﬂicts involving Spain, the campaigns of 1657 were inconclusive.
Furthering this theme of inconclusive results was the English raid on
Santa Cruz de Tenerife, led by Admiral Robert Blake. Numerous historians, when
supplying evidence for the decline of Spain, describe this event as Blake's capture
of the Spanish Silver Fleet. This, however, is deeply misleading. First, Blake did
very little capturing and far more destroying. It was certainly an unwelcome
outcome for Spain but not as abysmal, all things considered. Secondly, his ﬂeet
did not carry oﬀ the silver of the Indies. Despite the over-simpliﬁed and
condensed narrative presented by past historians, the battle of Santa Cruz de
Tenerife was far more inconclusive when considering the larger strategy of the
belligerents. Around April 28th Blake's ﬂeet appeared within sight of the silver
ﬂeet stationed at Santa Cruz. On the following day, Don Diego Egues y
Beaumont, admiral of the ﬂeet received notice of Blake's ﬂeet and immediately
ordered that the silver be disembarked and secured on Tenerife itself. This quick
action meant that the impending assault was thus prevented from reaching the
silver and causing fatal harm to the Spanish monarchy.
In any case, Blake approached the silver ﬂeet with roughly 30 ships (the
number ranges from 28-36 depending on the account) on the morning of 30 April.
When asked for his surrender, Egues is reported to have said “Let [Blake] try to
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come here if he wishes.”81 When the English ships did come, the seventeen
Spanish ships under Egues attempted to ﬁght oﬀ the English but by
mid-morning Egues knew that his cause was lost. His ship and the Vice-Admiral
continued the ﬁght into the a ernoon before he ordered that the ships be burnt
to avoid becoming English trophies. The English account of events respects
those two ships for their “considerable resistance”82 and Spanish pride was
spared by not losing such large warships to Cromwell’s Navy. More than pride
was spared though, as critically the English sailed oﬀ with far fewer prizes than
they had hoped. Whatever cargo from the Indies had not yet been brought
onshore was wrested oﬀ Spanish ships by Blake’s men. In his report to King
Philip, Egues highlights that the loss of material goods was not so great.
Moreover, he claimed that in looking over the records of the voyage, he
discovered and corrected fraud which has netted the royal treasury more than
what Blake escaped with.83 This was no more than evidence of an oﬃcer
attempting to save their own neck; however, King Philip’s response to these
events indicated that he felt it to be something more.
Recall that in 1655 when King Philip IV ﬁrst received word of Blake's ﬂeet
stationed oﬀ Cadiz he feared that their capture of the silver ﬂeet would bring
about the ultimate ruin of the Monarchy. When news reached him that Blake had

81

Cesáreo Fernández Duro, Bosquejo biográﬁco del almirante D. Diego de Egues y Beaumont y relacion
del combate naval que sostuvo con ingleses en Santa Cruz de Tenerife, año 1657, La Andalucía, 1892, 16.
82
England and Wales Parliament, “An Order of Parliament with the Consent of His Highness the
Lord Protector, for a Day of Publike Thanksgiving,” Early English Books Online, 1658.
83
Cesáreo Fernández Duro, Bosquejo biográﬁco del almirante D. Diego de Egues y Beaumont y relación
del combate naval que sostuvo con ingleses en Santa Cruz de Tenerife, año 1657, Andalucía, 1892, 18.

71
indeed attacked the ﬂeet he wrote to Sor Maria, "[the silver ﬂeet] fought with
[the English], but as they were few they were forced to burn them, so that the
enemy did not take them; but as what they brought was already disembarked on
land, it was only the loss of the vessels.”84 Clearly, King Philip IV did not consider
this to be the death blow to the Monarchy. In a body of letters brimming with the
lamentation of a man who believed himself cursed by God, this remark stands out
as a mere half-hearted shrug in the face of the event. Moreover, he awarded
Egues with an encomendero in a location of his choosing, as well as further
government appointments. This should have been entirely out of place had the
King felt Egues had behaved dishonorably or was deserving of punishment.
Instead, it further indicates that the Monarchy was singularly concerned with
ensuring the silver reached Spain, without much thought as to how, nor how
quickly.
While they were primarily interested in the idea of American silver
reaching Spain, it was not because it was contributing signiﬁcantly to enriching
their coﬀers. By this time, the wealth of the Americas was not directed to the
Crown treasuries, rather it was o en directed to foreign bankers to continue
paying oﬀ loans which were in considerable arrears. Some historians have
attempted to use Santa Cruz as an explanation for Spanish defeats in Flanders, or
an abandoned invasion of Portugal, yet such an explanation is destroyed by the
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paper trail.85 Silver from the Americas was rarely able to go from Veracruz or
Lima to Cadiz, to Madrid, and then back out to the average soldier. First, because
the currency in the Spanish Empire fundamentally did not operate like that. A
number of diﬀerent coins existed as intermediaries of exchange which gave
ﬁnance ministers considerable manipulation of the currency. Then, there existed
the considerable foreign interest, in the form of bankers, who essentially could
lay claim to the silver at Cadiz as recompense for the loans which the Spanish
Monarchy had taken from them. An inability to arm troops in the campaign
season of 1657 had more to do with ﬁnancial trouble in years prior than it did
with any singular event that occurred during that campaign season. To suggest
otherwise demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of Spanish ﬁnances,
and gives undue credit to the speed at which they operated.
Additionally as was so o en the case, King Philip was more interested in,
and more disheartened by events and concerns in Portugal and Flanders.
Whether the battle be in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Southern Italy, or Jamaica, King
Philip, and by extension the royal apparatus he headed, ranked it below the
concerns of Portugal and Flanders. Indeed one observer noted that “It is resolved
in Spain to invade Portugal by land with a formidable army, and to send a ﬂeet to
the Indies to beat the English out of Jamaica; but there being care to be had for
Catalonia for these parts and for Italy, I know not how the king of Spain will be
able to supply all places, where his assistance is required.”86 This remark
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succinctly represents the divided attention of Philip IV, and the need to prioritize
certain places over others. In a similar vein, from 1657 through 1658 King Philip
was deeply invested in the forthcoming election of Holy Roman Emperor. The
relationship to the Austrian Habsburgs was understood to be the bedrock of
Spanish foreign policy at this time so it was critical that Philip’s desired
candidate sit on the throne as Emperor. In this particular election, he favored his
nephew Leopold over Archduke Leopold Wilhelm. Mazarin pushed both the
unlikely election of Louis XIV himself or the somewhat more likely Ferdinand
Maria of Bavaria from the house of Wittelsbach. That Philip IV helped in
securing Leopold’s elevation to the Holy Roman Emperor was not suﬃcient to
secure Leopold’s full support in the future.
Meanwhile, the domestic situation in England in 1657 was colored by the
question involving Cromwell and the Crown. It was not the only issue causing
concern in the country, but it was certainly one that informed much of the
discourse at this time. Agents of all the major European powers wrote letters and
reports indicating that they expected Cromwell to accept the crown and begin a
new dynasty in England. The move seemed surprising to some, as the republic
appeared well embraced by many in England. It also frightened the newly allied
French who believed that a newly crowned ‘King Oliver I’ was going to seek a
separate peace with Spain to ensure domestic tranquility a er securing his
throne.87 The basis of such a treaty held that Cromwell was satisﬁed with his
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gains thus far and was willing to work towards peace at home and abroad. Such
thinking had little grounding in fact as it was unlikely that either side would
entertain a treaty at that point. Spain surely was not able to consent to a peace
wherein England retained Jamaica, and the English desire underlying the Treaty
of Paris was the capture of Dunkirk, a feat which was as yet unaccomplished.
There was also internal opposition to the coronation of Cromwell. Loudest
amongst the dissenters was the Army which had more or less been ruling the
country in the period now referred to as the Rule of the Major Generals. The
calling of the Second Protectorate Parliament had largely ended that period, but
the inﬂuence of the army was still strong. Leading this faction was General John
Lambert, who felt that a return to monarchy betrayed the central purpose of the
revolution. Considering that Cromwell and his Protectorate were in the midst of
war, it behooved the government to avoid antagonizing the army if it could be
avoided. The “Humble Petition and Advice” as it was, already upset the military
by reducing their budget to a still staggering million pounds per annum. Such
outspoken dissent was watched intently by foreign observers and royalists
abroad, who felt the instability it created was detrimental and beneﬁcial,
respectively. To assuage such fears of internal turmoil, and perhaps to quiet his
own conscience, Cromwell responded to the Humble Petition in a speech before
Parliament saying, “I am perswaded [sic] to return this answer, That I cannot
undertake this government with the title of king; and this is my answer to this
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weighty aﬀair.”88 Cromwell’s rejection was not just of the crown but of the entire
Humble Petition and Advice which meant turmoil was avoided, but stability was
unachieved. General Monck wrote to Secretary Thurloe that month imploring
both Cromwell and Parliament to reach an agreement for such stability’s sake,
indicating perhaps his chief desire.89 It appeared that stability was achieved later
that same month when Parliament agreed to reinstate Cromwell as Lord
Protector while Cromwell accepted the remainder of the Humble Petition,
including its call for the “Other” House. While the Humble Petition and Advice
in its modiﬁed form retained the republican government, the monarchist
thinking which produced it remained active in English political life beyond 1657.
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Twilight of the Franco-Spanish War and its Eﬀect on Jamaica
Despite fundamentally seeing Jamaica’s cause as less important, in 1657
King Philip claimed to be sending the Armada to the island. However, he
rescinded that oﬀer by April of 1658 because, "it is so important that the galleons
depart later to bring the treasure of silver that one hopes with all abundance
those of the kingdoms of Peru and Tierra Firme, as well as that New Spain have."
Still dealing with the fallout of the attack on Santa Cruz, which ﬁnally ended
with the silver reaching Cadiz in May 1658, King Philip could ill aﬀord to risk his
galleons on a mission that did not enrich his needy Royal Treasury. It was more
important that the galeones and ﬂotas proceeded along their set course without
making dangerous detours to engage English vessels eager to plunder the richly
laden ships. Clearly Philip IV subsumed the recovery of Jamaica to his immediate
need to get the treasure from the Indies. That need was the Crown's driving
policy governing the Indies at this time. It is important to recognize that the
Court in Madrid viewed the Indies as a source of silver and little else. The
Spanish monarchy had not yet reached a point where it viewed its colonial
empire as a source of income through investment in agriculture and industry. It
was still very much a distant place from which mineral wealth was to be
obtained. Again, there had been little need to seek alternative revenue streams at
this point in time.
Thus by 1658, the government in Madrid had well and truly come to
believe that the reconquest of Jamaica had to be carried out by local force. That is
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to say, by arms, money, and leadership which was already located in the
surrounding area. 1657 marked the end of real open warfare for the island, and
1658 can be seen as the end of Peninsular interest in recovering the island
through military force. With that mentality in mind, King Philip was greatly
displeased with the performance of local forces before, during, and a er the
defeat at Las Chorreras. In particular, the king was enraged by the lack of
coordination between his oﬃcials.
having increased the relief that all the Windward Islands have sent to that
island for its defense, and more particularly what you, with all abundance
and providence, had sent, all have rotted, not only fruitless, but with
disgrace to my arms because of the disobedience and vileness of Captains,
corporals, and soldiers from which the failures resulted.
Apparently, Reyes had not made enough of an impression on the king and did not
merit the praise which Egues had received a year earlier. It was imperative that
oﬃcials in the Caribbean work together if the Crown was going to successfully
recover Jamaica without dispatching aid from the peninsula. The insubordination
of Reyes’ caliber contributed heavily to the “rotten” status of Jamaica.
The disorder and disagreement between local oﬃcials was simultaneously
resolved and exacerbated by the defeat at Las Chorreras. In 1657 there had been
disagreement between Isassi and Bayona y Villanueva about where to land relief
troops and supplies on Jamaica. Isassi had favored the southern portion of the
island as there was looser English control and less naval presence. Bayona y
Villanueva on the other hand, favored the north of the island, as it was an easier
journey to make; all it required was a simple channel crossing. A demoralized and
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desperate Isassi conceded to Bayona y Villanueva’s northern plan to ensure that
supplies could reach him. However, he did so while scolding Bayona y Villanueva
and criticizing de los Reyes’ actions before, during, and a er the defeat at Las
Chorreras.90 While Bayona y Villanueva may have won that issue, it did not mean
that he was in the right. Far from it, as his superior in the Americas, the viceroy
Duke of Albuquerque rebuked him in a letter from 21 March 1658. Albuquerque
wrote:
I do not know this man nor have I ever seen him in my life, but I know
that the King and the Council have appointed and elected him and all
whom the King and Council appoint and elect represent Him in the place
where they are, and subjects have no right to oppositions, competitions or
slander but only blind obedience, which is the best road by which to merit
the favor of the King and of his Council...I also ﬁnd in Don Cristobal that,
being a native of the island...he must know them better than any other.91
This accostment of Bayona y Villanueva was truly indicative of how Castilian
nobility viewed themselves, their role in government, and how that role served
them.
Albuquerque demanded blind obedience from Bayona y Villanueva and
reminded him that such obedience is imperative to advancement within the
Crown hierarchy. It is a poignant reminder of the constraints which bound
colonial oﬃcials. Blind obedience to orders which came either infrequently or in
dizzying succession coupled with other orders which were out of date by the time
they arrived, without a doubt created frozen colonial governments which
struggled to keep up with the rapidly evolving situation created by strong English
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naval presence around Jamaica. The constant threat of English attack was, as has
been shown, paralyzing, but fear of losing one’s position, power, and reputation
were also powerful reasons for inaction. The case of don Pedro Zapata provides a
powerful example. Zapata had been one of the ﬁrst colonial oﬃcials to send aid
to Jamaica and had sent it on three occasions. In February of 1658, 3 years a er
having sent that aid, he had to justify doing so to the King. He informed the king
that “help...sent to Jamaica in no way deprived Cartagena of anything necessary
for the safety of that port.”92 He had no orders to send such relief and if he had
done so while exposing Cartagena to damage or capture he faced severe
reprimand that could have cost him his position. His case highlights the lag in
communication and the severity of acting without, or outside of, clear orders. It
also shows that actions were taken without prior orders to do so when the ability
and opportunity presented itself and that perhaps colonial administrators were
not drones awaiting orders from the hive. Taken in combination, it’s quite
apparent why colonial oﬃcials chose to fortify their ports and strengthen their
defenses.
At the core, King Philip did not want colonial governors, presidents, or
even the viceroys to risk their domains for the recuperation of Jamaica. To that
end, King Philip did authorize relief from Spain to New Spain on 22 September
1658. This showed that while there was an ability to mobilize arms and relief in
Spain and get it to the Indies, it is just that it was not intended for Jamaica.
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Despite earlier assuaging the king by stating that New Spain could withstand any
invasion by resorting to scorched earth policies (assuming an enemy had a skilled
enough pilot to land troops in New Spain), Albuquerque had later come to the
realization that he required some assistance. King Philip heard Albuquerque and
was able to authorize arms be sent there. There was however, a large fuss over the
costs and how those arms were to be delivered, by whom, and in what quantities.
It also appears that this aid was to be paid for by two Basque men from San
Sebastian rather than the Crown directly. This made sense considering that the
Crown had supplemented taxes through donativos or voluntary donations to the
Crown by the nobility.93 It hardly bears repeating, but this is yet another clear
example of the Crown’s priorities; the defense of the colonial centers came before
any organized attempts at the recovery of the colonial periphery. Since Jamaica
was not producing steady Crown income for generations, a concerted eﬀort to
maintain the island was not considered.
Meanwhile, the president of the audience of Panama had obtained
information from a former prisoner of Jamaica who explained all the best places
to enter the island. These positions could be used to resupply the people and
recover the island. Guzman decided that the information should go to Don Pedro
Zapata, the governor of Cartagena so that he could arrange the dispatch of a ship
to those spots. This made sense since Cartagena is closest to the southern part of
Jamaica and satisﬁed Isassi’s desire to have provisions land there. Guzman also
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notiﬁed Albuquerque of this information as a matter of course. It is not clear if
Guzman was aware of Bayona y Villanueva's incorrigibility and sought to
circumvent his authority. It could just have been that from the information given
to him he came to the same conclusion as Isassi that the southern part of the
island made for the best landing spot. The former prisoner had, as many other
prisoners had before, informed Guzman that the English were planning further
attacks. Guzman, like Albuquerque and Bayona y Villanueva, took measures to
secure his own dominion ﬁrst and foremost before seeking to recover Jamaica.
His aid was in forwarding pertinent information along the chain of command. He
could not and did not send material aid.
Moreover, from Isassi’s perspective, sending further men to Jamaica only
intensiﬁed his diﬃculty in supplying those men. In May 1658, a second relief
force from New Spain under Alvaro de Raspuru arrived in Jamaica to assist Isassi.
However, this force proved no more successful than the last force, albeit for
diﬀerent reasons. A er he received news of the disaster at Las Chorreras, Isassi
returned to the North of Jamaica and established a camp at Rio Nuevo.
Meanwhile, the contingent from New Spain landed on the island. Their journey
was not far from direct though. Like the relief force a year prior, they had been
routed through Santiago de Cuba and the hands of its infamous governor. Bayona
y Villanueva had been instructed to notify Isassi a er eight days if he was not
going to be sending that force immediately. Instead, Bayona y Villanueva delayed
sending the force for ﬁ y days. Isassi accused Bayona y Villanueva in August
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1658 of using that time to siphon oﬀ the best supplies, troops, and most of the
money destined for Jamaica. The 550 men sent compared to the roughly 400 that
landed in Jamaica support this, though it was also believed at the time that some
men had simply deserted while in Jamaica. In either case, the force that arrived in
Jamaica had already run through most of their supplies of food. Additionally, they
did not join forces with Isassi for eight days a er landing. Once they had met up,
the combined force of roughly 520 men was soon challenged by English forces.
As the men from New Spain were disembarking, a small scouting party of
English ships encountered them. In the ensuing naval skirmish, Raspuru
remarked, “Each little frigate of ours seemed a galleon of the royal ﬂeet, the way
they fought and palpably damaged them.”94 A er the brief engagement, the
English ships sailed oﬀ under the cover of night. According to D’Oyley, the ships
were not driven oﬀ due to Spanish resistance; rather, they were becalmed and
thus unable to engage further and board the Spanish ships.95 In any event, the
English were now aware of the presence and location of Spanish troops in the
north of the island. No sooner had Isassi and Raspuru met than they found
themselves engaged in combat.
Having resolved on 21 June to attack the Spanish, the English returned at
Rio Nuevo with 10 ships and over two thousand men (according to Isassi) on the
following day. The amphibious assault landed men on the beach where they were
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able to vanquish 23 Spaniards and take more than that number prisoner. In the
English account, this forlorn hope had managed to secure the beach under a
consistent, though futile, Spanish artillery barrage. Before continuing onto the
fort which the Spanish had constructed, the English opened ﬁre from aboard
their ships. However, as D’Oyley himself noted, their cannon shot was as
successful as the Spanish. As D’Oyley indicated in his account, he believed that
he was outnumbered, though if Isassi’s estimation is to be believed the English
outnumbered the Spanish roughly 4 to 1.96 D’Oyley’s calculation had convinced
him to halt for the day and attempt an assault the following day.
Having resolved to make such an attempt, D’Oyley nevertheless oﬀered
Isassi terms the night before. These terms were slightly but critically diﬀerent
from those oﬀered in 1655 in that they made no provision for these men to stay.
Surrender now meant a departure from the island. English controlled Jamaica no
longer tolerated a Spanish presence on the island. Isassi, who had orders from the
King to remain in Jamaica, and who was resolved to blindly obey them, refused
D’Oyley kindly and stated that Spanish troops would not surrender so easily.97 So,
a confrontation was had the following day. Isassi utilized a mixed defense of his
fortiﬁcation. Some of his troops lay in wait for the advancing English and ﬁred
from the woods before retreating back towards the fort. This was the style of
ﬁghting which Isassi was known to have preferred, but the fact that the main
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force was in the fort showed he was capable of more traditional ﬁghting. In
actuality, it was not very much unlike the type of defense which the Spanish
forces in Santo Domingo had mustered against the Western Design. However, as
the English forces soon discovered, the ﬂanks of the Spanish fortiﬁcation were
not yet complete. The result of the hasty fortiﬁcation was foreseeable disaster.
The English were able to pour into the fort from the ﬂanks while those Spanish
not already dead or wounded attempted to ﬂee into the woods. Isassi, in his own
report to King Philip, claimed to have lost over 300 men.98 Put another way,
three-quarters of the poorly armed, poorly equipped men who arrived on 18 May
were dead by 26 June.
The similarities between the defeats at Las Chorreras and Rio Nuevo are
not purely coincidental. They are indicative of the enormous disruption which
Pedro de Bayona y Villanueva represented in coordinated attempts at relieving
and recovering the island. His intransigence twice resulted in less men, supplies,
arms, and money reaching Jamaica, and reaching the island later than intended.
It is not impossible to imagine a scenario in which a diﬀerent governor
immediately sent relief to Jamaica, that relief was not spotted by the English, and
was, therefore, able to complete a fortiﬁcation before any imminent assault.
Moreover, he need not be seen as some traitorous conspirator, only a governor
interested in maintaining a fruitful partnership with nearby merchants. He is not
the sole reason why the Spanish were unable to retake Jamaica, but he was the
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primary reason why Spanish Caribbean forces were unable to do so. Towards the
end of the year, Isassi was able to report on English forces in Jamaica. According
to his report, they now had 3,000 armed men on the island, 8 merchant ships, 7
Dutch vessels, a ﬂagship with 54 guns, 200 men spread across two forts on the
future Port Royal, at Morante Point: 100 soldiers, ten pieces of infantry, and most
importantly, 300 farmers. Even before his defeat at Rio Nuevo Isassi had
bemoaned, “that [the English] know the island so well that they make war on me
all over it."99 Nearly all possible Spanish advantages were erased by 1658. The
only thing remaining, and barely so, was the support of the maroon community.
1658: The European Perspective
Although it occurred in the ﬁnal quarter of the year, the death of Oliver
Cromwell could claim to surpass any other event from that year in importance.
The only other possible event to rival it was the English seizure of Dunkirk. In
combination, these two events mark the end of the Protectorate and the English
experiment with republicanism; the beleaguered rule of Richard Cromwell being
its unfortunate epilogue. While the death of Cromwell hastened Charles’ return
to the throne, the capture of Dunkirk came to color that monarch’s foreign policy.
For Spain, and the ever pious Philip, Dunkirk’s fate represented the realization of
the worst-case scenario.
Philip had been concerned about the precarious situation of Dunkirk since
the combined Anglo-French forces had captured Montmedy and Mardyck in
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1657. Anyone with a map in front of them came to a similar conclusion, as they
lay so close to Dunkirk. Despite such knowledge, resupplying and refortifying
Flanders had been challenging for the Spanish monarchy since the closing of the
so-called “Spanish Road” from Italy to the Low Countries in the 1630s, and the
rampant piracy harassing the sea route.100 As such, the most Philip IV felt he
could do was pray for deliverance. This should not be mistaken for complete
helplessness, as the army of Flanders was typically the largest Spanish army,
larger than any on the Iberian or the Italian Peninsula. Moreover, early modern
conﬂict favored the defenders in a siege, so for whatever despair Philip may have
felt, he was not staring down an inevitably grim situation.
While it may not have been inevitable, Dunkirk did of course, fall. The
siege began on 25 March, and was supported by the Protectorate Navy
blockading the port and assisting in the landing of French troops. Indeed, history
o en credits the English with playing the decisive role at Dunkirk. According to
one estimate, 30,000 French troops were assisted by 40 English warships and men
preventing relief from reaching Dunkirk by sea (the reality was that 15,000
French troops were augmented by 6,000 Englishmen). However, it was also
possible that another English force could have turned the tide for the Spanish
side. James, Duke of York, and Henry, Duke of Gloucester, were commanding the
2,000 Royalist forces alongside Don Juan and the Prince of Condé. Their plan was
to cut through Flanders amassing men and supplies along the way, expecting to
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rally as much as 40,000 men to their banner. Clearly there existed in the Spanish
imagination the idea that there were as yet untapped human resources spread
about the empire. Regrettably for the Spanish, this relief force managed to gather
up to 15,000 men before approaching Dunkirk. At Valenciennes, the Spanish
relief commanded by that same Don Juan had been able to overrun Turenne’s
forces and successfully li the siege. At Dunkirk however, Turenne seized the
initiative and attacked the Spanish, leaving 6,000 men to maintain the siege.
What caused this defeat in the ensuing battle and its narrative is not nearly as
what it signiﬁed in the European and American contexts.
First, we can see in the Battle of the Dunes the central struggle of the
second half of the 17th century. The “Spanish” forces were extremely diverse, as
already noted, English forces made up a noteworthy component of this army.
There were also German, Walloon, Irish, and French troops in this force.101 Yes,
these men were mercenaries, but the rise of France ensured that men from across
Europe found themselves lining up against the armies of France. In time they
were joined by Dutch forces, and the Restoration brought still more English
troops. What once cost Spain a considerable fortune, amassing an army in
Flanders, was now to be given voluntarily out of self-interest. The latter half of
the 17th Century marked the incorporation of north-western Europe in the
Spanish project through commercial interests. Fearing Louis XIV on their
doorstep, the Dutch, English, and German princes came to the defense of
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Flanders to prevent outcomes that threatened the commerce they maintained
with Spain. Part of the traditional ‘decline of Spain’ narrative is their inability to
come to the defense of Flanders. However, the need to do so outright actually
dissipated a er this defeat. The Dutch and Holy Roman Empire supplied the
force while lax Spanish rule fostered the loyalty to the Crown. This outsourcing
of military might was part of the ingenious durability of the Spanish Monarchy
and was replicated in Jamaica, as will be shown.
From the Protectorate perspective, Dunkirk marked the apex of
Cromwell’s foreign policy. The Dunkirker threat had been removed, an alliance
with a major continental power had been established, and the colonial American
Empire had been expanded through the capture of Jamaica. The Anglo-Spanish
War had thus fulﬁlled its purpose, and not a moment too soon. The war itself was
never completely popular and at the onset was rather unpopular. Parliament
o en struggled to allocate funds to properly ﬁght the war, and was usually more
concerned with domestic aﬀairs and creating a more ‘rightly ordered society.’ It
must be remembered that mid-17th century England was a revolutionary state
and that the domestic political situation was constantly evolving. The letters,
House of Commons Journal, and other contemporaneous documents span a
breadth of concerns for the English government. Not least among these was
funding such a government.
Problems with taxation were not a uniquely Spanish problem; England too
suﬀered from a lack of funds ﬂowing to the government. The budget which the

89
Humble Petition and Advice put forward set aside one million pounds for the
military and only 300,000 for all other expenses of government.102 That same
article established that such funds were not to be collected through the hated
land tax, but the reality forced them to ignore that provision. With such tension
regarding funding an adequate government, the Protectorate could ill aﬀord
economic collapse. Financial ruin called into question the regime’s legitimacy.
For this reason, they had to reconcile the Spanish war to the economic hardship
felt by English merchants
It was devastating to merchants for two main reasons. Despite blockades
at Cadiz and the seizure of Jamaica, trade with England had been embargoed by
Spain, a move which was felt harshly by the English merchants in Madrid and
London. The English found markets closed to them and goods no longer
available. If the ﬁnancial pressure was not enough, the second mechanism which
Spain deployed to target the English economy was privateering. Indeed, the
military threat to all English shipping presented by the Dunkirk privateers was
also devastating. Although history tends to favor the exploits of English, French,
and Dutch privateers in the Caribbean, these Spanish-backed Flemish privateers
were equally successful. Having ﬁnally rid themselves of that threat, the
Protectorate now needed to turn towards peace with Spain to li the embargo on
English shipping. Had Cromwell survived 1658, perhaps the English could have
had a seat at the table for the coming treaty in 1659 and shaped a peace to their
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liking. However, the reality was that Cromwell did indeed die. For the next
decade war without conﬂict and peace without a treaty marked the
Anglo-Spanish relationship. The failure to conclude a treaty in 1658 or 1659
created an opportunity for Spain to win the peace in 1670.
Cromwell’s death, despite his refusal of the crown in May of 1657, was
akin to the death of a monarch. Despite numerous meetings and motions in
Parliament in 1657, the issue of succession had never truly been resolved. Thus,
while Cromwell lay dying, members of the government rushed to his side to
extract his successor from him. The choice was unsurprising if not disappointing;
his eldest son Richard assumed the title of Lord Protector.103 Now, although
Cromwell had refused monarchy in 1657, its specter had been raised again in
1658 ahead of calls for a new Parliament. It was believed by some to be the only
means to ensure further stability within the nation and to consolidate the
progress which they had made.104 Before his death, Cromwell had asked General
Monck to serve in the ‘Other’ house of Parliament which was understood to be a
de facto House of Lords. Monck’s coy refusal to do so, and to remain at his power
base in Scotland reveals that Monck may have already been preparing for his role
in the Restoration. According to historian C.H. Firth’s reading of Secretary
Thurloe, Cromwell had made up his mind in 1658 to accept the position of king.
In that context, his naming of Richard as successor was all too certain. It allowed
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for the possibility of revising history and naming Cromwell as king
posthumously, and Richard his heir. However, the persistence of a political
climate which favored monarchy was dangerous considering there was already an
English monarch across the channel.
Indeed, almost immediately following the death of Cromwell, Thurloe
notiﬁed Cromwell’s son Henry of rumors about a conspiracy within the army.
Secretary Thurloe feared that “there are some secret murmurings in the army, as
if his highnes were not generall of the army, as his father was; and would looke
upon him and the army as divided.” Thurloe admitted that he did not know what
such thinking could lead to, but that it did not bode well for stability in the
country.105 The year prior, Henry Cromwell was concerned about the growing
intimacy between General Lambert, who had opposed monarchy the year before,
General Desborough, and General Fleetwood.106 If the connivance of 3
Major-Generals was an alarming internal problem, the Fleet’s letter to Richard in
October was indicative of a growing external threat. The Oﬃcers of Fleet wrote
to the new Protector swearing “to stand by you to the hazard of life and estate,
and to defend you against Charles Stuart and his adherents, and all who
endeavour to place the legislative authority otherwise than in a single person and
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2 houses of Parliament.”107 Clearly the Fleet understood the vulnerability of the
Protectorate following the death of its ﬁrst Protector. Indeed Royalists abroad
felt that their moment was nearing, as the Earl of Norwich wrote in December
1658, “We hear of great disorders in England, and... Letters from Brussels say our
master's business in England was never in so fair a way as now...I am conﬁdent
that before 3 months we shall hear of strange changes.”108 Indeed strange changes
came to pass in 1659.
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The End of Spanish Resistance
The most important development of the Spanish position in Jamaica
actually took place far from the island in the chamber of the Council of the
Indies. It was in 1659 that they ﬁnally decided to hold a formal inquiry into the
situation in Jamaica and what steps could be taken to recover the island. The
main testimony before the council was given by Francisco de Leiva Isassi, don
Cristobal’s brother. The questions asked and responses given indicate the
fundamental disconnect between the ministers of the council and the situation
on the island. Technically though, the Council had no authority or jurisdiction
over the island and never had. Recall that it was the personal domain of the
descendants of Christopher Columbus. From 1494 on, the council had rarely
made any inquiries about Jamaica and had little knowledge of the island.
The report created by the Council inquiry began with a recollection of the
events on the island before 1659. The defeats at Las Chorreras and Rio Nuevo are
accounted for, and signiﬁcant blame is placed at the feet of Bayona y Villanueva
and de los Reyes. This is unsurprising considering that the Governor of Jamaica’s
brother was giving the testimony, but still it does represent an important
acknowledgment of their guilt. Where Francisco de Leiva Isassi perhaps went too
far is in claiming that had Bayona y Villanueva complied with the orders given to
him, Jamaica would undoubtedly have been reclaimed. At Las Chorreras that may
have been true, but by Rio Nuevo his mere compliance was not enough. The
knowledge that such a situation was true was evidenced by the council’s pressing
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of Leiva Isassi to indicate what size force was necessary to reclaim the island.
Leiva Isassi dodged giving a direct answer and only stated that what was needed
was the assembling of a strong naval force in that endeavor. He seemed keenly
aware of the King and Council’s reluctance to commit too many men to the
undertaking. Instead, Leiva Isassi proposed a plan which was not unlike the
Western Design. Some men and ships were to be outﬁtted in Spain, and they
were to be substantially augmented by troops and supplies already located in the
Caribbean before making for Jamaica. Perhaps a small detachment could break
oﬀ from the already scheduled ﬂotas and perform such a task. When presented
with this plan, the Council chose instead to counter with one of their own which
required a diﬀerent investment of resources.
Their plan, or hope really, was embodied in one of the questions they
posed to Leiva Isassi. They wondered if the English could be paid to abandoned
Jamaica. While the question was likely an honest inquiry, it demonstrated that
the Council of Indies placed the English control over Jamaica within the context
of piratical English raids. Underscoring their unwillingness to risk manpower
and naval power from Spain directly to reclaim the island was this fundamental
misunderstanding of the long term intentions and consequences of the English
seizure of Jamaica. It was hard for these council members to conceive of an
immediate need to dispatch the armada to reclaim the island if they believed that
the English might just as well abandon it once they recovered whatever plunder
they sought.
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Moreover, such a perspective makes plain that they believed the island to
lack any foreseeable value either to themselves or to the English. Historians who
seek to argue that the loss of Jamaica was immediately recognized as a crushing
blow must reckon with the persistence of these perspectives four years a er the
initial conquest of the island. Because they did not view the English presence on
the island as anything more than an existential threat to hegemony over the
Indies they were not prepared to risk more to remove that threat.
They simply did not recognize or fully understand the potential disruption
the English in Jamaica could cause. This Council of the Indies was the same
council which notiﬁed Philip IV of growing English, Dutch, and French presence
in the Lesser Antilles without recommending any measures to reverse this trend.
109

The hegemony over the Western Hemisphere which Spain claimed was not

understood to be as indefatigable as their claim over Portugal. Its loss was
neither as bitterly felt, nor as ﬁercely pursued. So while the English on Jamaica
once again threatened that supposed Spanish monopoly of the Americas, Spanish
men were not to be sacriﬁced for that cause alone. Men like Leiva Isassi resorted
to sounding alarms that such a presence posed a threat to shipping, in particular
the silver ﬂeets. Yet, anyone aware of the route of the ﬂeets understood that the
ﬂeet only passed Jamaica on its way to pick up silver, not a er. Moreover, many
believed that the ‘miracle’ of Santa Cruz could be repeated should the ﬂeets come
under attack again.
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Despite all this, Leiva Isassi declined to answer the question about if the
English could be bribed to give up Jamaica. Yet he clearly understood what the
Council members wanted to hear; he responded,
since they have sown in the island and are reaping its fruits and carrying
on general trade it seems to this declarant that they will not evacuate it for
any inducement on account of the many interests and concerns they have
there, but that with the death of Cromwell it may be that the Commanders
have been changed and some negotiation can be attempted with them.110
By 1659, it was clear to colonial oﬃcials that the English were setting up a stable
colony on the island, much like their islands in the Lesser Antilles. However,
there was still some hope that a change in government might produce the return
of Jamaica to Spanish control. A er all, the Treaty of Brussels established that
should Charles return to the throne of England, Jamaica was to be Spanish again.
Most scholarship only considers that treaty in how it shaped Anglo-Spanish
relations a er the Restoration, but fails to consider its impact on those same
relations before that time. Such failures in the scholarship leave one perplexed as
to why the death of Cromwell made waiting the preferred method of
‘reconquering’ Jamaica. For reasons that will become clearer in the next section,
the conclusion of peace with France in 1659 did mean Spanish attention was
directed towards another enemy. However, Portugal came into the Spanish
crosshairs, not the English, and certainly not English Jamaica.
Meanwhile, Isassi’s position on Jamaica was becoming completely
untenable. Isassi found himself desperately low on many necessities. In letters to
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Bayona y Villanueva, he demands beef in an almost childlike manner, perhaps as
a sign of in what regard he held Bayona y Villanueva. He wrote, “I have very little
beef, so you will supply me for I have not enough for six days. If you do not help
me, we shall be in a bad state for beef is what is needed. Supply me with beef.”111
As usual any aid was going to be slow coming and records indicate that for the
ﬁrst time in 3 years no relief entered the island. Having committed himself to
small-scale guerilla-style warfare, Isassi went to the southern portion of Jamaica
to harass the heavily fortiﬁed English presence there. He claimed to the King to
have had some success but there appears to be no such evidence of these attacks
in the English sources. So, with his small band of ﬁ y men, Isassi could still
claim to fulﬁll his orders in maintaining a presence on the island. However, it
was clear to anyone with authority that only with a change of the English
government could control of the island change hands.
As was mentioned, by 1659 the English had truly established their
presence on the island. It is in this year that we see the central internal tension
that deﬁned the next decade in Jamaica, take root. On the one hand, the planting
interest was on the rise as evidenced by new requests for wives to join their
husbands on the island.112 This demonstrated that there was a belief in England
at the time, at least among some people, that the island was both safe and
respectable enough for these women to desire to go there. This is further
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demonstrated by increased interest in the creation of a West India Trading
Company amongst government oﬃcials in London. While the creation of this
company did not come to fruition, it was still an important indicator of the
change occurring on the island. What many had previously been seen as a thorny
consolation prize of a failed military expedition was becoming an opportunity
worthy of investment. It should come as no surprise then that the ﬁrst oﬃcially
documented slave importation under English occupation was in 1659.113
Directly opposed to the planting interest was the privateer or
buccaneering interest in the colony. The ongoing guerrilla resistance of the
Spanish, as well as the maroon and free-blacks, meant that substantial military
resources congregated around Jamaica. There were also the persistent rumors of
an impending Spanish invasion of the island which required a constant patrol of
ships circulating around the island. Crewing these ships and manning the forts
were men o en found wanting by their commanding oﬃcers. Moreover, as early
as 1657, Jamaican commanders such as Lt. General Brayne had to send out
soldiers to ‘make their own way’ as it were by engaging in activities like hunting.
However, his predecessor, Major Sedgwicke, had also described these men as
lazy. It was well-known that these soldiers were generally uninterested in
planting, and occasionally deserted rather than work on a plantation.114
It is thus not diﬃcult to comprehend why such men preferred to be a
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privateer or buccaneer. These would-be privateers found a receptive ear in the
person of Captain Christopher Myngs, the captain of the Marston Moor, who had
arrived to command the Jamaica station in 1656. Much like the relationship
between Isassi and Bayona y Villanueva, Myngs and D’Oyley were men at odds
with one another. While they both sought to make Jamaica safe and proﬁtable,
Myngs was more interested in securing proﬁt ﬁrst and foremost. In 1659 he
chartered a course towards the Spanish Main much like Vice-Admiral Goodson’s
4 years earlier.
Myngs’ resulting raids on the towns of Cumaná and Coro on the northern
part of South America were materially far more successful than Goodson’s had
been and ushered in the creation of Jamaica’s reputation as a haven for the
privateering sort. Although the inhabitants in these towns had ﬂed into the bush
at the sight of the ships, taking their valuables with them, 2 Dutch ships ﬂying
Spanish ﬂags were unable to escape Myngs’ ﬂeet. Estimates of the haul state that
Myngs’ raids captured between £200,000-£300,000 with the majority coming from
silver ingots inside two chests seized aboard the Dutch vessels.115 It may be
tempting to suggest that this was another devastating blow to royal coﬀers, but it
must be remembered that silver destined for Spanish ports did not mean it was
destined for Spanish hands. In any event though, it marked a huge success for the
privateering interest in Jamaica and London and proved that signiﬁcant gains
could be achieved through this policy. However, the raid was not without
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controversy, and though it has never been conclusively proven it is believed
Myngs divvied up the spoils with his oﬃcers and crew before returning to
Jamaica. D’Oyley condemned the action and sent Myngs back to London. This
was not the end of the now infamous Captain, and he returned to plague the
Spanish Caribbean.
But perhaps the most critical development in Jamaica was the English
discovery of a Black Resistance community in the center of Jamaica. It is
hypothesized that during the previous 4 years, these communities had supplied
needed food to Isassi’s men on their way to ambush English forces. As evidence
for this, historians cite the settlement, or pelinco, of Juan de Bolas. Covering
roughly 200 acres of farmland, it is not unreasonable to think that it provided
food for more than just the inhabitants surrounding it. Crucially, it was this
settlement that English forces under the command of Lt. Col. Tyson stumbled
upon in late 1659. They had known that there were 3 main settlements that made
up the Black Resistance in Jamaica, and now, having discovered one, the English
were ready to ﬁnd the other two. To do so they brought the leader of that
particular community, de Bolas, to Port Cagway to parlay.116 With their greatest
advantage now neutralized, de Bolas recognized the need to join forces with the
English to ensure his community’s survival and autonomy. The English promised
to respect the sovereignty of that community under Juan de Bolas in exchange for
de Bolas leading his men against the other two communities. In the coming year,
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his faction of the Black Resistance deﬁnitively turned the tide for England and
helped determine the next phase of Jamaican history.
1659: the European Context
Similar period-deﬁning events occurred in Europe as well in 1659, whose
eﬀects only entered the Caribbean context in the next decade, if at all. 1659
harkened the end of Richard Cromwell and hastened the Restoration. This year
also saw the conclusion of the Franco-Spanish War with the Treaty of the
Pyrenees. The fact that these two processes occurred independently of each other
had explicit consequences for Anglo-Spanish relations especially in regard to
Jamaica. The domestic situation in England was running its own course,
surprisingly independent of foreign intervention which ensured that Spain did
not play a decisive role in restoring Charles to the throne. In their Treaty of
Brussels, Spain was called to militarily support Charles’ restoration and
a erward, King Charles II was to renounce the English presence in the Americas.
In previous years, military intervention in domestic English aﬀairs was deemed
impossible due to the war with France. In 1659, that war was concluded with the
Treaty of the Pyrenees and intervention was plausible. However, events within
England seemed to make that intervention neither necessary nor desirable.
The political situation in England became volatile almost upon the
ascension of Richard Cromwell to the title of Lord Protector. As has been
explained, Richard represented the logical choice for succession from a
monarchical perspective. If that perspective is changed though, other options
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were quite viable. For example, Henry Cromwell was undoubtedly the better
Cromwellian candidate for a hereditary Protectorate. His experience governing
in Ireland made him an appealing option. However, he was in Ireland, had almost
no base of support in England, and did not desire the position himself. There was
a relative of Oliver Cromwell who may have coveted the title, that person being
Major-General Charles Fleetwood. He too had experience governing Ireland, was
located in England, and had the respect of the army. Naming Fleetwood his
successor could have ensured the stability of the Protectorate, but it could have
just as easily cost it its legitimacy. It would essentially solidify the Protectorate as
a military rather than a civilian government. Indeed, both he and Henry were not
satisfactory candidates; the political tide had turned away from the military
towards the civilian since the end of the ‘Rule of the Major-Generals’ and the
adoption of the Humble Petition and Advice.
Sensing and fearing this turn, Fleetwood moved towards the end of 1658 to
solidify his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Even though Richard had
not shown any indication to replace him or place anyone above him, Fleetwood
wanted to consolidate his place in the political system.117 Fleetwood claimed that
his maneuvering was not in deﬁance or opposition to Richard, but those in the
army, supposedly his army, saw the opportunity to question Richard’s legitimacy.
In one of several letters to Henry Cromwell at this time, Secretary Thurloe wrote,
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“Sometymes the ﬁre seemes to be out; then it kindles againe.”118 That “ﬁre,” was
the ‘Good Old Cause’ and it came roaring back in 1659.
Ambiguously deﬁned, the so-called ‘Good Old Cause’ was associated with
the sovereignty of Parliament in a ‘Free-State’ and the rejection of the arbitrary
power represented by kings, lords, and bishops. Army oﬃcers like Fleetwood and
John Lambert, alongside political ﬁgures like Arthur Haselrig, felt that the
Humble Petition and Advice had thrust such arbitrary power back to the fore. As
evidence, they cited the creation of the ‘Other House,’ which was the House of
Lords in all but name, and the debate of Cromwell taking the crown.
Underscoring this tension was the fact that payments for the army and navy were
both well in arrears, and new revenue was a necessity, revenue which could only
be called for by Parliament. The need then, was for a Parliament that ensured the
payment of those arrears without using any arbitrary powers. Richard as
Protector and the ‘Other House’ were thus cast as impediments to securing this
end.
Thus, once Parliament was convened at the end of January 1659, the
process of stripping Richard Cromwell of power and dismantling the
Protectorate along with him began. First, was the call to reaﬃrm Richard as Lord
Protector. Though the vote passed and he retained his title, the debates served to
seriously undermine his authority and legitimacy. Moreover, it branched out into
debates which called into question the organization of the Parliament with
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regard to the ‘Other House.’ Essentially, a faction within Parliament dedicated
itself at the start of 1659 to the repudiation and destruction of the Government of
the Three Nations under the Humble Petition and Advice. Finding themselves
numerous but not the majority, their attempts at using the House of Commons to
control the entirety of government were unsuccessful.
Their allies in the Army were, therefore, necessary to enact their vision for
the future of the Three Nations, that is the Three Nations organized under the
sovereignty of the Commons. In April then, Fleetwood called for a meeting of
army oﬃcers to air their grievances with the current state of the nation. The
oﬃcers petitioned Richard, asserting that they were for the ‘Good Old Cause,’
which they consciously associated with the payment of their arrears.119 Fearing
that he was losing his grip on the nation, Richard called a general muster later
that same month. Unfortunately, the nation did not rally to Richard’s banner and
he was from then on, eﬀectively neutralized in politics. The uneasy alliance of
Fleetwood and Haselrig reinstated the Rump Parliament, which had last met in
April of 1653, on 6 May 1659. While many a true republican might have been
overjoyed, the move did not produce the desired outcome. Agents of the
would-be King watched the aﬀairs intently and reported back to Charles that the
nation was divided to their beneﬁt. A royalist minister by the name of John
Barwick observed that what once appeared as one party was, in fact, three; there
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were the senior oﬃcers which preferred the Protectorate and Richard as ‘puppet’,
the junior oﬃcers in support of the Long Parliament, and the MPs in favor of
that same Parliament but without the interference of the Army.120
So when Fleetwood found the Rump not to his liking, he disbanded
Parliament in the Autumn. The decision was fatal to English Republicanism. To
simplify the political landscape at the time, it might be helpful to consider four
key factions. One being the former cavaliers and royalists who supported the
restoration of Charles Stuart. Another group supporting the Protectorate, with
some supporting its evolution into a new Cromwellian Monarchy. Then there
were those who were in the Rump, or who supported it, and believed in the ‘Good
Old Cause’ and looked to the United Provinces as their model.121 Finally, there
was the army; being such a massive group, they naturally found themselves also
spread out amongst the other three factions but generally threw their support to
whomever could pay their long-overdue salaries. Fleetwood’s dismissal of the
Rump shattered this political scene sending the fractured pieces into new camps.
Whereas in May, the Army and Rump were allies, and the army itself
united, by November no such unity existed. The Senior Army Oﬃcers, like
Lambert and Fleetwood, sought to foster stability through the creation of a
Committee of Public Safety headed by themselves. This drew a stern rebuke from
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junior oﬃcers as well as the Army of Scotland, led by General Monck. Indeed,
Monck indicated that while he did not want continued civil war, he was prepared
to engage in it if the Long Parliament was not restored.122 Adding to the
uncertainty were members of the general public who pleaded with Fleetwood to
restore the Rump and avoid exercising arbitrary power. There were even those
who questioned what right he, or Lambert, had to call any such Parliaments
going forward. Those people recognized that an army general calling Parliament
to order was a military government with the trappings of the ‘Good Old Cause.’
This situation had made the more monarchical side of the spectrum bolder in
their public appearance, both Cromwellian and Royalist.
By the end of 1659, Richard tried to reinsert himself into the political
scene as Lord Protector by invoking one of Aesop’s fables, that of Zeus and the
Frogs. Richard deliberately and explicitly cast himself as ‘King Log’ thus
resurrecting the specter of a Cromwellian dynasty, albeit a far less frightening
prospect. However, the analogy and the earnest attempt it represented failed to
lead to the desired outcome. This was probably because Richard was appealing to
the Stork, not the Frogs. The failure of his ‘Humble Petition’ was truly Richard’s
exit and the ultimate end of the Protectorate as a model of government. With
Richard, and therefore the Protectorate, no longer a viable option for the Three
Nations, General Monck had precious few options when he began his march to
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London. Many desired his intervention though, as they saw their cause reﬂected
in his personage.
This destabilization was naturally viewed by Charles and his supporters as
extremely favorable to their cause, but not without its own perils. There was a
fear that the internal turmoil could cause England to seek a peace with Spain,
thus stripping Charles of a key ally. Indeed there was an ambassador sent for just
such a purpose. Meanwhile, within England, speculators worried how their
current political situation alienated their French allies, or any other foreign
powers interested in partnering with them.123 Lockhart, the English ambassador
to France, traveled to Dunkirk and then requested to leave his post and return to
England upon hearing of the restoration of the Rump. The Dutch meanwhile,
sought to reaﬃrm their friendship with England, despite a period of rising
tensions, due primarily to the Dutch relationship with Spain. A er Fleetwood’s
dismissal of the Rump though, the famous Admiral De Ruyter angrily notiﬁed
Ambassador Nieuport not to trust any further treaties or alliances with England,
“till I see some eﬀects of those conventions, which we have already made with
that state.”124
At the same time, the French had turned their attention from England
towards the all-important peace with Spain. The internal English situation meant
that Spain, for the ﬁrst time since 1656, could aﬀord to look at aﬀairs in England
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as a distant concern. Looking back on 1659, King Philip remarked, “the aﬀairs of
that Kingdom are in such turmoil with each other, that while their unrest lasts
they will not bother us much…”125 The turmoil which Philip IV cited provided a
convenient excuse to avoid dispatching relief from Spain to Jamaica.
Furthermore, it led Philip IV to believe that the bargain he struck with Charles II
was about to come to fruition. Also, both Spain and France were ready to
negotiate with each other without worrying so much about England’s place in the
treaty. For France, the simmering conﬂict between England and Spain to France’s
west freed them up to pursue their own interests on their eastern border.
Spain pursued the end of 24 years of war for much the same reason as
France, in a sense. Peace with France was essential to pursuing Philip IV’s
ultimate aims in Europe and his obligations as a Habsburg Monarch. Peace on
their eastern border gave them a free hand to pursue the ﬁnal thrust for Iberian
uniﬁcation. The 24 years of inconclusive warfare in which they had been engaged
had fundamentally sunk Spain. The French war had destabilized Spain
domestically (i.e. Castilla and Aragon) and threatened to separate her from her
important European possessions in Italy and Flanders. However, the greatest and
most enduring losses that Spain suﬀered as a result of this war were dealt to
them by England and Portugal. Dunkirk, Jamaica, and the whole of Portugal were
lost forever to Spain. At the time though, the permanence of these losses was not
imminently apparent. Rather, from the Spanish perspective, it all seemed to be
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within reach through peace with France In September 1659, with the Treaty of
the Pyrenees nearing its completion, France broke oﬀ its military commitments
to England. In Madrid it was rumored that in the coming days the Spanish
Governor of Flanders was going to enter Dunkirk and see it peacefully returned
to Spain.126
The appeal of recovering from the greatest losses to Spanish prestige and
power was too strong to be denied. Therefore it was imperative for Spain to seize
the opportunity oﬀered by Mazarin and France. To such an end, King Philip
oﬀered his daughter, the Infanta Maria Theresa, as the bride of Louis XIV. King
Philip, in being so eager for peace, had ordered his ambassador in Paris to agree
to much of the treaty as early as the end of April.127 The territorial losses of Artois
and Roussillon, while major, were far more palatable when seen in the larger
context. From the perspective of traditional Habsburg policy, King Philip could
claim to still be preserving the territorial integrity of the Habsburg monarchy by
not losing the entirety of the dominions which those cities were a part of. By
concluding a peace now, in 1659, King Philip was ensuring that the bleeding
stopped there and that losses stopped on other fronts, namely Portugal. The
centrality of Portugal in King Philip’s domestic and foreign policy should not be
forgotten. In the secret articles of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, France agreed to
cut oﬀ aid to Portugal, and to cease harboring Portuguese ‘rebels.’ France also
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agreed to stop supporting England in its war against Spain. These secret articles
should have therefore provided Spain with the free hand it needed to deal with
both kingdoms swi ly and deﬁnitively. First Portugal would be retaken, then
Dunkirk and ﬁnally even Jamaica.
However, the Treaty of the Pyrenees is o en regarded as unimportant
primarily because it did not provide the long term peace which it should have.
Despite the centrality of the Habsburg-Bourbon marriage, France proved
unmoved to respect the sovereignty and borders of their new in-laws. Moreover,
the impending Restoration did not usher in swi peace with England as it should
have. As will be seen, once Charles was given control of Great Britain he charted
a political course that matched his new role as king better than his former role of
exile. What this meant for Jamaica was that the promise of having it handed over
on behalf of Charles II had to be abandoned. The diﬃcult work of planning,
preparing, and executing a reinvasion of the island had to be carried out. This
could only take place once Portugal had been reunited with Spain. The English
and French both continued to work against Spain on the Portuguese front
eﬀectively keeping Spanish power from crossing the Atlantic.
1660 Prior to the Restoration
Back in Jamaica, the turbulence of England and the resolution between
France and Spain had little impact on the internal conﬂict still gripping the
island. King Philip’s relief at the political situation of England was indicative of
how little he factored Jamaica into his vision. When King Philip thought of
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Jamaica at all, it was inextricably linked to his treaty with Charles II and his
restoration. This in part explains why 1660 was not the year in which we see a
Spanish armada outﬁtted to rendezvous with Governor Isassi and retake the
island. The restoration of Jamaica to Spain could be worked out by diplomats, not
generals. As a result, this year marks the anticlimactic end of Isassi’s resistance.
Isassi was steadfastly committed to the idea that he could lead and execute
a guerrilla resistance until a larger sea-borne force relieved him. To that end, he
remained on the island with his men, including a special military advisor named
Juan de Tovar, also committed to the cause. These two leaders found themselves
completely outmatched by Juan de Bolas by midyear. Recall that in 1659, de Bolas
and his pelinco had been stumbled upon by the English. As part of his
arrangement with the English, de Bolas agreed to pursue and destroy the other
Black Resistance communities as well as the Spanish Resistance. Unfortunately
for the other two main Black Resistance communities and the Spaniards, de Bolas
had all the information necessary to rapidly carry that out.
It’s unclear when exactly the two other Black settlements were attacked by
de Bolas, but by February 1660, word of his alliance reached the Spaniards.
Although they had not yet met de Bolas in open conﬂict, the Spaniards were well
aware they were doomed. On 22 February they resolved to leave Jamaica stating,
...in view of the news that had been received that the settlement of Juan
Lubolo had joined the enemy. All the Captains present were of the opinion that
the island should be abandoned for the reason that the negroes are so
experienced and acquainted with the mountains that no success could be
obtained there but that we were all exposed to the known risk of being murdered
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without escape.128
Just the mere fact that the Black Resistance had allied with English was enough
to make the Spanish surrender. It was at this point that the leadership
understood well that these communities were not, and had never truly been,
under their command. With that support withdrawn, they knew their cause was
lost and their choice was between death or departure. Just four days later, their
fear came to fruition as they were routed by de Bolas with the loss of roughly 140
men. At this point, Lt. Col. Tyson oﬀered terms to Isassi and the process of
evacuating the island began. The importance of the Black Resistance in the
overall schema of Spanish Resistance is evidenced by just how quickly the
Spanish surrendered upon hearing of their defection to the English. Isassi and
the ﬁ y or so men who remained with him a er the defeats of Las Chorreras and
Rio Nuevo were loyal to King Philip IV and believed in the righteousness of their
cause. Jamaica was their home and had been the home of their respective families
for generations. They refused to leave the island time and again and were willing
to withstand malnutrition and English attacks. Yet, they were decidedly
unwilling to endure attacks from the Black community of Jamaica. Isassi’s ﬁnal
oﬃcial surrender was drawn out over the course of the next 3 months due to the
diﬃculty of communicating quickly and arguments over prisoner exchanges. But,
in May of 1660, an important channel crossing was made. Don Cristobal Arnaldo
Isassi looked back from his small boat towards the island he had ﬁercely
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defended for 5 years and which he never returned to again.
The Spanish-American eﬀort to reconquer Jamaica failed for two basic
reasons: the ﬁrst was external in that other oﬃcials pursued the preservation of
their islands and colonies ﬁrst and foremost, leaving Jamaicans on their own.
While scholars point to the two failed relief expeditions as evidence of Spanish
inability and inadequacy, they are more indicative of Spanish apathy towards
Jamaica. It was well understood in Jamaica that the best men were not dispatched
to assist them, and that food and other supplies were o en withheld. With
stubborn governors like Pedro de Bayona y Villanueva, who needed enemies like
Colonel D’Oyley? The advantage of keeping their best men at home to defend
against further English raids and the advantage which further English trade
presented was overwhelming in ensuring that the Jamaican eﬀort was poorly
supplied. The second reason was internal; it lay with the Spanish inability to fully
understand the Black Resistance. This failure ensured that they did very little to
court or entice their support throughout the entirety of their resistance. By
misunderstanding the Black desire for freedom and independence as loyalty to
their King, the Spanish did nothing to solidify or create common cause with what
was arguably the island’s most powerful force. Indeed, the development of these
groups into the Maroon communities ensured that Jamaica was not fully paciﬁed
until the middle of the next century.
Simultaneously, the Peninsular Spanish eﬀort to retain Jamaica was
oxymoronic; there was never going to be any real eﬀort coming from Spain
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proper. If the galeones and ﬂotas were able to complete roundtrip voyages, Philip
IV saw no issue. The European theater was always more pressing, with Portugal
becoming particularly acute. King Philip’s obsession with an Iberian Union
continued to rob the Americas of a consistent and eﬀective Spanish naval
presence. The Franco-Spanish war ended in 1659, and a truce was declared with
England in 1660. Rather than utilizing those mobilized forces in the Caribbean
theater, Philip IV deployed those forces and more in returning Portugal to
Habsburg control. The same pre-occupation which prevented the silver ﬂeet
from making a detour to Jamaica in 1658 continued to prevent such action
following Charles II’s Restoration. In the absence of signiﬁcant naval opposition
to Restoration Buccaneering, Spain relied on her diplomats to defend Spanish
Imperial interests from the capitals of Western Europe.
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Conclusion: Jamaica and the Dowry of Charles II
While Isassi was crossing the small channel between Jamaica and Cuba,
Charles II was making a far better known channel-crossing. The Treaty of
Brussels should have meant that Charles’ restoration resulted in the restoration
of Spanish territory lost to the Protectorate. That this did not happen is worth
investigating to conclude the present history. One of the main concerns of the
restored monarchy was funding itself. The Convention Parliament of Charles’
restoration managed to limit the power of the monarch through the power of the
purse so as to not outwardly be seen as constraining the King. They settled on
£1,200,000 for his annual revenue, a sum which had Charles II begging before
Parliament to resolve his dire situation. He pleaded saying, “I come to put you in
mind of the crying Debts which do every day call upon me for some necessary
Provision.”129 To satisfy those debts and continue to pay for what was needed to
‘defend the kingdom,’ Charles had to look beyond Parliament. One of the most
promising avenues for the 33 year old king was through marriage. A dowry could
provide a quick and substantial inﬂux of money to his royal coﬀers. The only
questions then, was how much and whom?
For the next two years, King Philip sought to provide the answer to these
questions. The marriage of Charles II was a matter of the peace and security of
Spain because Charles was the missing piece in Philip IV’s diplomatic isolation
of Portugal. Marrying Charles into his family, and away from the Braganzas,
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oﬀered him a free hand with which to crush that rebellion. Critically missing
from this plan though was a daughter; Maria Theresa had just married Louis XIV
and carried an unpaid dowry. His younger daughter Margarita was both 10 and
already betrothed her uncle and cousin, Leopold, the Holy Roman Emperor. To
solve this problem, the desperate Philip IV oﬀered to adopt a Princess of Charles
II’s choosing. He ﬁrst oﬀered the Princess of Parma, along with a dowry
equivalent to whatever the Portuguese were oﬀering. When the Princess of
Parma was no longer a viable option, Philip continued to oﬀer Princesses to
Charles, even sacriﬁcing his ﬁrm religious stance. To assuage anti-Catholic
sentiment in England, Philip IV oﬀered the Princess of Denmark, Saxony, and
Orange to Charles.130 However earnest and competitive these oﬀers were, they
were also fundamentally ﬂawed, and therefore unacceptable to Charles.
Two key factors prohibited the union of Spain and England through
marriage, both regarding the proposed dowry and directly aﬀected by Jamaica. As
far as the ‘cash’ involved in the dowry, the Portuguese were oﬀering England
roughly £500,000 in various trade goods. Even though Spain was prepared to
match that amount, the prevailing opinion was that Spain was oﬀering an empty
promise. In 1659, they had agreed to a sum of 500,000 écus as the dowry for Maria
Theresa. As Charles was considering marriage proposals, that sum was not yet
paid to Louis XIV. It, in fact, was never paid and hungover Spain until 1714.
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Charles needed money as soon as possible and even the current delay of Maria
Theresa’s dowry was too long for him. Moreover, as another historian has put it,
“if [Philip] denied the payment of the dowry to a true infanta of Spain, no
guarantee existed that a surrogate would get hers.”131 Even if King Philip were to
oﬀer more cash as part of the dowry, his credit was literally too low to be able to
pay it and Charles was acutely aware of this. Their treaty of Brussels should have
guaranteed Charles roughly £100,000 to support his restoration, but Spain’s
actual payments never matched that promise.132 The diﬀerence between the
Portuguese and Spanish proposals becomes even greater when the territories
oﬀered are considered.
In addition to the £500,000, Portugal oﬀered the territories of Tangier in
North Africa, and Bombay in India. If Charles accepted the Spanish match, he
had to restore both Dunkirk and Jamaica. Just on this surface level, it is
stunningly obvious why he never agreed to any marriage proposals oﬀered by
Spain. It’s tempting to ask why Philip didn’t oﬀer those two places as part of the
dowry: it helped Philip rationalize their loss within his role as a Habsburg, and it
could have actually secured the match. However, as has been stated, the
prevailing belief at the court was that both places were to be returned shortly.
The Marquis of Carecena, governor of the Spanish Netherlands, was preparing to
reincorporate Dunkirk into his fortiﬁcations budget. Meanwhile, news came that
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an English ship had been stopped by Spaniards and told them they were headed
to Jamaica to inform the English there to surrender it back to Spain.133 Moreover,
the Spanish tended to misunderstand the importance of Spanish trade in
England. When presenting potential matches to Charles, the Spanish ambassador
to England, Baron de Batteville, opened by stating that was necessary to England.
It wasn’t entirely false, as the unpopularity of the war among the merchants
showed, but it was exaggerated. Philip IV fundamentally believed he was owed
Jamaica through his treaty from 1656 and should receive Dunkirk through the
pressure of the English merchants.
On the contrary, English merchants were actually pressuring Charles to
keep Jamaica despite what seemed like the end of the conﬂict. Almost
immediately upon Charles II’s restoration, a truce was agreed between the two
powers. The Restoration government found this war too much at such a critical
juncture. For one thing, it was unpopular and had been started by his hated
predecessor. Even D’Oyley, who was on one of the front lines of the war, called it
in 1660, “the unsuccessful war with Spain.”134 Unsurprisingly he greeted the news
of the truce with joy publicly, but with confusion privately. When notiﬁcation of
the truce reached him in February 1661, it was not accompanied by marching
orders. In a letter to a distant cousin, Secretary Edward Nicholas, D’Oyley wrote
that he, “Has impatiently expected orders from his Majesty, how to carry himself
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in this great and happy change, but in their absence has pursued his former
instructions.”135 By ‘former instructions,’ D’Oyley meant hostile action against
Spain in the form of privateering. Continuing the war in the Caribbean was both
acceptable in contemporary diplomatic thinking, and in line with Charles II’s
intentions to keep Jamaica and make it proﬁtable.
While the English goal was peaceful free trade in the Indies, they utilized
the commonly held belief of ‘No peace beyond the line’ to obtain that goal. So
while in February 1661 D’Oyley ordered the cessation of hostilities, the very next
month he reversed course and held that the truce with Spain did not apply to this
side of the line.136 In addition to proﬁt through privateering, the English in
Jamaica were encouraged to pursue trade with the Spanish, speciﬁcally in Cuba.
But Royal Oﬃcials understood well that there might be Spanish resistance to
English merchant activity. In 1662, the new governor Thomas Windsor was
ordered,
To endeavour to obtain and preserve good correspondence and free
commerce with the plantations belonging to the King of Spain, but if the
Governors of said King refuse, to endeavour to settle such trade by force, and by
doing such acts as the Council shall judge most proper to oblige the Spaniards to
admit them to a free trade” (emphasis added).137
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Herein lies the central double standard of English policy in the Caribbean at this
time. England was attempting to violently pry open the jaws of the Spanish
monopoly of the Indies while engaging in diplomatic negotiations in Madrid. By
1664, the policy failed and Charles II’s ministry actively distanced itself from the
actions of buccaneers that claimed to be serving the same monarch.
So despite false reports they were preparing to return the island, all the
documentary evidence shows that the English were planning to consolidate their
control over the island. While oﬃcials in Jamaica were told to treat Spaniards
like stubborn hoarders, wresting anything of value from their hands, they were
also ordered to cultivate a peaceful domestic atmosphere. The goal very early on
was to replicate the success of Barbados in Jamaica in nearly every way. One of
the cornerstones of that plan included sending colonists from Barbados itself to
rapidly build the plantation economy in Jamaica. This included the promise of 30
acres of land to any settlers that quickly relocated there.138 To ensure speedy
settlement, the Governor of Barbados was ordered to promote, rather than
inhibit, the movement of settlers from his island to Jamaica. Moreover, as early as
November 1660, England sought to transform Jamaica into a slave hub in the
West Indies. James, Earl of Marlborough advised Charles, “To persuade the Royal
[African] Company to make Jamaica the staple for the sale of blacks. The King to
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contract with that Company for 100 negroes to be delivered at the island.”139 They
also wanted Jamaica to serve as a gateway for slave trading into Spanish cities
and ports. In 1662 some 200 enslaved Africans had oﬃcially been sold from
English ships to Spanish cities, to make no mention of those illegally smuggled
into Spanish ports. In June 1661 D’Oyley himself was accused of having sold 140
slaves to a Spanish ship which had passed by. That same year, the President of
the Audience of Panama detained an English ship that had entered the port on
the pretense of trying to catch English pirates. The claim was believable enough
but President Aguero felt they were lying and that “the truth is that his principal
care was to see if there is a way to introduce the blacks and merchandise which
were brought in the vessel.”140 In this particular case, Aguero chose to deny these
men entry and relay the information to Madrid rather than engage in the illicit
trade.
While the appearance of English sails in his port was tense, it still ended
peacefully, a marked diﬀerence from similar moments both before and a er. Less
than a year a er this aﬀair was Christopher Myngs’ raid on Santiago de Cuba in
October 1662. A raid like this was undeniably foreseeable given the
likemindedness of oﬃcials in London and Port Royal. In April oﬃcials in
London had given Windsor permission to force open free trade. By August he had
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received word from the governors of Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico that they
were resolved not to engage in trade. From that point forward, Windsor had all
the justiﬁcation necessary to order a raid on a Spanish city. In September, the
council approved a ‘design by the sea’ led by the Centurion commanded by Myngs.
141

Myngs’ justiﬁed the decision to sack Santiago de Cuba by highlighting its role

in resupplying the Spanish resistance before 1660. This may have been due in
part to the fact that he found Isassi leading part of the defense to his raid, whom
he described as a “great friend.”142 To ‘revenge’ the harm which Santiago de Cuba
had done to the English for 5 years, Myngs allowed the complete destruction of
the town. According to one Spanish oﬃcial there, “they burnt and blew up the
Holy Church Cathedral, some hermitages and most of the houses of this said
City...demolished the Castillo del Morro and ruined some platforms at the mouth
of this port.”143 Clearly then, there was no peace beyond the line in 1662. In
Europe too, the situation seemed to be on the brink.
In 1662, despite the attempts and protests of Philip IV, Charles married
Catherine of Braganza. The marriage alliance called for Charles to provide
soldiers for the rebel cause, an article which alone should have caused war
between the two. If that wasn’t enough, the Spanish feared that the English
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squadron sent to take command of Tangier was secretly planning an attack on
that year’s ﬂota. Highlighting Spanish precariousness and importance, a Dutch
convoy led by Admiral De Ruyter oﬀered to protect the ﬂeet and saw it safely
delivered to Cadiz.144 Further compounding the calamities was another English
insult, namely their sale of Dunkirk. Charles decided to sell the city for much the
same reason he chose Catherine of Braganza, ready money. While again the
Spanish had made a competitive oﬀer, Charles chose to sell it to France. In
combination, these events led many in London and Madrid to believe that war
was imminent. In his diary, Pepys’ remarked,
I am sorry to hear that the news of the selling of Dunkirk is taken so
generally ill, as I ﬁnd it is among the merchants...Indeed I do ﬁnd every
body’s spirit very full of trouble; and the things of the Court and Council
very ill taken; so as to be apt to appear in bad colours, if there should ever
be a beginning of trouble, which God forbid!
The prevailing feeling was that this action was enough to cause war with Spain
and that merchants were going to once again lose out on the Spanish trade.
However, that same month Philip explained to Sister Maria that he refused to
ﬁght any new wars unless violently provoked ﬁrst; Philip was ﬁrmly on the
defensive.145
What this meant was that England and Spain essentially found themselves
staring at each other waiting for the other one to oﬃcially declare war. Neither
side actually wanted open conﬂict in Europe so each stopped short of actual
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outright violence. England wanted to maintain and strengthen their trade
partnership, and Spain was committing all military eﬀorts to Portugal. This is
not to say that there wasn’t conﬂict by proxy. The military assistance from
England to Portugal certainly constituted one example of this kind of low-scale
conﬂict but it was far from the only example. When Portugal handed Tangier
over to the English, the Spanish were not the only ones to feel slighted by the
transaction. North African forces under the leadership of Abd Allah al-Ghailan
were engaged in besieging English forces in the area on and oﬀ until his death in
1673. During this time, he was sponsored by Philip IV and received assistance
from Spain. At court, the meticulous letter-writer Jéronimo de Barrionuevo went
so far as to refer to al-Ghailan as “a friend and our supporter.”146 Spanish support
of al-Ghailan was more eﬀective but far less intriguing than their attempts to
create another revolution in England.
As Robert Stradling alleges, Spain was allocating funds and fostering
contacts in England who could lead and manage an uprising against Charles’
government.147 They had even identiﬁed a potential leader in Edmund Ludlow
and were utilizing the services of Ignatius White as their chief spy. In a letter
written by one of his assistants, the Spanish cause was explicitly identiﬁed as a
response to the sack of Santiago de Cuba. He wrote, “The Spaniards are greatly
incensed because some English went ashore in the West Indies, killed several
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Spaniards, and plundered the country; they will try to raise a mutiny…”148 The
recipient of the letter promptly notiﬁed the Earl of Clarendon and the plot was
snuﬀed out in Ireland. However, eﬀorts like this show that rather than meekly
accepting the insults laid upon them by England, Spain was able to instead wage
covert warfare and back-oﬀ when it suited them. The contemporary thinking
which allowed Charles to commit hostile acts in the West Indies without
breaking a truce forced Philip to use underhanded techniques in Great Britain. In
certain respects these actions form the core ‘playbook’ of the hegemon; sowing
discord secretly and then disavowing it publicly continues to be a tactic used to
create favorable outcomes for powerful nations seeking to protect their
reputation.
The reason why Spain was trying to refrain from appearing as an
aggressive power was because they could not aﬀord to lose the support of the
Dutch, who had maintained a good relationship with the English. Dutch
protection of the ﬂotas was absolutely critical, as was their construction of
warships for Spain.149 Despite this close relationship, the Dutch sought to
conclude a long and ongoing war of their own, one borne out of their struggle for
independence from Spain. Unfortunately for Spain, this meant that the Dutch
were entering into negotiations with the Portuguese. Seeing the favorable terms
which the marriage to Catherine had brought England, the Dutch sought to also
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‘cash in’ on the Portuguese desire for allies. The resulting Treaty of the Hague
secured all Portuguese colonies except Guinea and granted the Dutch the same
trading privileges as the English, along with a four million reil indemnity for the
parts of Brazil which the Dutch had captured. The Dutch did not completely
sever ties with the Spanish as a result of the treaty, but they were neutral going
forward and sold crucial supplies to the Portuguese until the war’s end.
Philip thus had to fully commit himself and subjects to the Portuguese
rebellion if there was any hope of success. To this end, Philip pressed hard for a
naval blockade of Lisbon and a patrol of the Portuguese coast. The naval build-up
that accompanied this spread contracts across Spanish possessions to build
warships and outﬁt them. In March 1661, the council of war had ordered 50
warships to be prepared for use against Portugal. This was in addition to the
30,000 man army they were trying to gather.150 The annual sentiment regarding
Portugal was that this was the ‘last year’ or the ‘last thrust’ and that the current
campaign season was going to result in the successful invasion of Portugal and
the ﬁnal ﬂames of the Braganza pretense smothered. Perhaps the highest cruelty
for Philip was that each campaign season brought a wave of hope only to end in
some sort of despair. In 1661, the despair was due to the death of his prime
minister, Don Luis de Haro. The news was greeted on the Portuguese front by his
illegitimate son Don Juan de Austria with glad tidings. He is said to have
remarked, “The king has lost a Great Minister, my Lord; but let’s go hunting”
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clearly feeling that with de Haro gone, the king was about to allocate more
resources to Portugal.151
Even though the king absolutely wanted to put all the remaining strength
of Spain into the campaign, his highest remaining oﬃcials saw the writing on the
wall. Philip reorganized his bureaucracy a er de Haro’s death and le matters of
Spain and the Indies to him alone. Meanwhile, he le aﬀairs to the West and
North to the Duke of Medina de las Torres, one of the key ﬁgures of inﬂuence
going forward. The Duke had been mentored by Count-Duke Olivares, but had
come into his own as viceroy of Naples. He was seen by many and still is, as
pragmatic when confronting the numerous challenges faced by the beleaguered
monarchy. For years, he had advocated for a truce with Portugal as a prelude to
an honorable and satisfactory peace with the rebels. Now, ﬁnally realizing the
inﬂuence which Olivares desired for him, Medina de las Torres could actively try
to bring that about. He was not alone in this thinking though, the Count of
Peñaranda, one of the delegates at Westphalia and one of Medina de las Torres’
rivals, also felt that a truce with the Braganzas was necessary. However,
Peñaranda believed that a truce should necessarily be followed by a regrouping
and renewed hostilities. Given that, it is less surprising that the two statesmen
o en disagreed on a course for the House of Austria.
With mounting pressure to put an end to the ﬁghting, however
temporarily, Philip had to ﬁnd ways to fund the annual campaigns. Having
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already reduced the salaries of those ministers holding multiple oﬃces to the one
of their choosing, Philip resolved to utilize the full wealth of the Indies. He
believed that there was still an abundance of silver and gold which they need only
scoop up onto their ﬂeets and bring back to Spain. He was cautioned against
burdening the Indies too heavily though, as the fear was that in doing so, he was
allowing smuggling to ﬂourish.152 Indeed the leadership in Tierra Firme had seen
illegal trade start to ﬂourish around Maracaibo, eﬀectively cutting the governor
oﬀ from that port.153
The thinking on display by Philip IV showed exactly where his priorities
were at the start of the 1660s and where they had always been. At a time when
there was a ﬂurry of Spanish naval activity, so much so that the English were
awaiting an invasion of Jamaica, Philip IV directed it to the familiar Portuguese
coasts rather than remote Jamaica.154 When that invasion did not come, Governor
Windsor was ordered to disband the army and allow for the fullest development
of a civilian, planter society within the island. Facilitating this transition was the
nearly 1,400 enslaved Africans sent across the Atlantic to the island between
1661-1663.155 Another critical moment had slipped through Philip IV’s ﬁngers,
yet he did not see it that way. For in his mind he was fulﬁlling his ultimate duty
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and pursuing the reunion of Portugal will the fullest rigor possible. Jamaica was
an insult to his honor, yes, but so was the sale of Dunkirk, the marriage to
Catherine, and deference shown to French ambassadors over his own. He had
tolerated all of these because they were nothing but distractions from what had
become his only obsession. In 1659, the diplomatic isolation of Portugal was
nearly complete and all that was le was the dispatch of a triumphant army
across the border.
Yet by 1663, the Portuguese were receiving Dutch war materiel, found
their forces augmented by English veterans, at the head of which was a former
French Marshal. This utter reversal in such a short time meant that the force
necessary to recapture Jamaica wasn’t even a consideration in civil discourse. In
any case, as far as the Indies were concerned, there was little to complain about.
In this same timeframe, the galeones and ﬂotas had each made 2 successful
roundtrip journeys to the Indies, something which had not been done since 1653.
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So despite the hardship and suﬀering felt at Santiago de Cuba and the more

immediate threat of the English in Tangier, Philip IV’s primary hopes for his
New World possessions were coming to fruition. His ministry, and the ministers
that outlived him, were going to be responsible for discovering how best to
engage with the English of Jamaica and their attempts to ‘force a free trade.’
Meanwhile, Charles II’s ministry dispatched Ambassador Richard
Fanshawe to Madrid to begin work on the treaty of peace and commerce which
Bartolomé Antonio Garrote, Maniﬁesto... En Que Demuestra Que Las Armadas Y Flotas de Nueva
España Y Tierraﬁrme Han Salido de Estas Reynos Para La América Todos Los Años Successivamente,
Desde El de 1580 Hasta El de 1699, Sevilla, 1699.
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eventually became the Treaty of Madrid in 1670. They sent over a new governor
to Jamaica who was explicitly instructed on numerous occasions to refuse
commissions to privateers. As the ambassadors Fanshawe, Sandwich, and ﬁnally
William Godolphin worked on securing peace beyond the line with Spain, the
Jamaican Governor Thomas Modyford found carrying out his orders diﬃcult.
Modyford found himself at the mercy of the privateers and buccaneers that called
Jamaica their home. With limited Royal Navy presence in Jamaica, it was easier
for Modyford to issue commissions rather than risk the buccaneers turning on
Jamaica. While privateering raids largely failed to make the Spanish receptive to
trade, Modyford continued to pursue the policy until he was removed from oﬃce
in 1668. For that reason, the Treaty of Madrid was a protracted negotiation of 6
years because it was stalled whenever word reached Madrid of English
depredation in the Caribbean. When it was ﬁnally completed in 1667, and then
explicitly revised to its ﬁnal form in 1670, it called on England to repudiate and
crack down on piracy and privateering and opened up Spanish-American ports to
English merchants. Crucially, it explicitly recognized Jamaica as an English
possession in the Caribbean. The breakdown in the Spanish monopolization of
the Americas suﬀered, but the commerce and wealth which the Americas
brought to Spain did not. Instead, the most proﬁtable years of the Empire lay
ahead. The sun had not yet set on the Spanish Empire.
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